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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STA1'E OF UTAH
HANSEN, et al., for himself
and for and on behalf of 191 other
1wrsons similarly situated,
(:,\HY

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
VS.

BR(YrHEHHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE
FJRKMEN AND ENGINEMEN and
844 of BROTHERHOOD OF
LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN AND
ENGINEMEN,

Case No.
11726

Def cndauts-Appellants.

OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIYE FIREMEN AND
ENGINEMEN and LODGE 844 of BROTHERHOOD
OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN AND ENGINEMEN

NATURE OF THE CASE
ri1his is an action commenced by Gary S. Hansen

and others for themselves and "for and on behalf of
191 other persons similarly situated" seeking damages
against defendants based upon alleged contracts and
brt>aches of fiduciary duty.
1

DI8POSrl'ION lN 'l1HE LUWER coe1n
The case was tried to the court without a jury ani\
the court found for plaintiffs. The ruling of the
court was bast, d upon its findings of fact and eonclus1·0 .
of law filed and entered herein in the record at
579 through 595.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek a reversal of the judgment in the
lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arose out of a National Labor Relations
Board (herein referred to as "NLRB") election campaign wherein the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen (herein called "BLF&E" or "Brot11erhood") was seeking collective-bargaining rights of a
group of employees at the Kennecott Copper Mine. The
contract of these employees was held at that time by
Local 485 of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union
(herein referred to as "Mine-Mill"). The campaign began in the middle part of September, 1966, and ran
through the 21st of June, 1967.
From the beginning, in September 1966, through
February or March, 1967, organizers working for the
Brotherhood solicited membership from the group then
represented by Mine-Mill. Among the numerous benefits
of the Brotherhood which were advertised in the solicitation were the constitutional provisions regarding strike
2

Grnd'it payments.

Employees who joined during this
iiHw \\'(•re i>romised strike benefits according to the Constitution of the Brotherhood if they would join and vote
for the Brotherhood in this campaign.
From and after February 1, and possibly as late
March 24, 1967, some of the organizers involved locally
represented that strike benefits would be paid to those
who joined the union, regardless of the outcome of the
NLRB election.
Tlw NLRB e>lection was held on .June 22, 1967, and
the BL F&g lost. Subsequently, Mine-Mill was again
certified as the bargaining representative of a unit including plaintiffs herein. The BLF&E has never at any
tinw bt>en bargaining agent for said unit.
On .f nly 14 and 15, 1967, a strike was instituted at
Kennecott Copper Corporation properties by all of the
unions involyed The BLF&E called the members in its
bargaining nnit on strike per an authorization by President Gilbert at 12 :01 p.m., July 15, 1967. (Exhibit P-138,
R. 798.) Prior to that time, some of the other unions had
institutPd their strike. (R. 797; R. 963.)
On or about July 31 or August 1, 1967, the first
BLF&E strike benefit payroll was prepared and submitted to the Grand Lodge. This payroll contained the
names of the plaintiffs in this action, under erroneous
,job classifications expressly contra to a letter of int-;truction received by Martin Jensen from R. R. Bryant,

3

Exhibit D-HH, and PXlll'Pssly contra tht• instruetiow; r
11
the blank payroll forms sent out h>- th(' Brotlil·rhooJ
Exhibit P-78. This 1iayroll was n·ject<·d hy J>l'l':-;i<fon;
G i llwrt and retm·ned to thC' Local Lodg(' with ti!\• in
structions that only those uwmlwrs of the Brotherhow\
in tht> bargaining nnit r<'JJn·se11f('(l hy tli<> HL:F'&:E anil
covt>red by the> contract at KennPcott should be ineludr·d
on it.
Suhs<>qnently, a revist>d payroll wa:s S!·nt
Brotlwrhood which did not contain tlw 1rn11ws
plaintiffs in this action. That pa>-roll was paid.
tiffs in this action did not receive strik<> lwrn•fits
time during tlu• strike>.

to thP
of tJ:,.
Plainat am

PrC'sident GilbPrt of the Grand Lo!lgP, RLF&:E. informed Lodge 8-±4 and tlw plaintiffs of his int!'rprf'tation of the Constitution whieh forhad paymPnt of strike
bc>nefits to these plaintiffs. H<> also infomwcl them at
this time that their only re>medies W('l'l': ( 1) An appral
to the Convention; (2) A pl<•a to tlw Financ(' Co1mnittPP
for special assistance. (R. 1243-45.)
Subsequently, a pl<'a was instituted to tlw Finanr0
Conunittee of the Grand Lodge of the BLF&:E. Tlw
FinancP CommittPP vokd 5 against and :1 for
of special strike assistance. (Exhihit P-29.) Tlwn•fore,
no strike assistance was authorized for t}wse
However the Finance Conunitt<>e did autlioriz<' a11
'
amount of $10,000 to ht> paid into a spPrial fund for
hardship ca:ws among tlwsl' iwopl<>. (Exl1ihit

4

<li<l llot make· an ap1H·al to th<· Conven11,,11 ,ii· llw Broth<·rltood on th<· intPrpretation placed
npnn tl\(' Constitution hy Presid<>nt GilhPrt. (R. 765;
t )
IC
Dnring the m<>mlwrsl1ip campaign, each member
was gi\'(•n a copy of tlw Constitution or a copy
\':a:-: !llacl<· n·adii.'· availahlP to him. (R. 1060-61.)

POINT I
THE FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH THE
JlTDG:'IIENT BELOW IS BASED ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

TliP trial eonrt PlT('d in its first finding of fact that
plaintiff
.James Oliver was a member of defrnrlant union at thf' timP of tlw strike involved in this
Tlt1•rp is nneontradich•d evidPnce from the records
of clPfrndants to the contrary. (R. 998; R. 924; R. 938;
Exhihit D-rnO.) Exhihit D-190, which was admitted as
!'Yid(•nce, indicat<'s that Mr. Oliver was never a member
of <lµfrndant unions. This exhibit was prepared from the
r1·<"<>rcb of tlw BLF&:E bv Martin .J Pnsen, Financial Secrdary of the Local. (R. 1253-54.) Further, Oliver's name
<lot's not ap1war on the initial strike pa.'·roll, Exhibit
P-i.\ or on the depC'ndant's lists, Exhibit P-75 and P-76.
ThP only <>videneP presented by Oliver was his testimony
that lit> signt>d sonw papers. He gave no proof of making
nny chws paynwllb and tlw records show he made none.

rl'l1P court's first finding of fact that Heriberto
F.sqniwl is a proper plaintiff is not supported by the

pleadings. The record in this case indicates clearlrJ ti- iat
this man never intervened as a I)laintiff • TJ- 1"•, f"i natnotice of joinder and representation of plaintiffs filed
by counsel for plaintiffs was filed on the 24th of Mai1968. This notice contained a list of all the 1iarties
were plaintiffs in Exhibit I, Part A, attached thereto,
and it also contained a list of all those possible plaintiffs who had not intervened as Exhibit I, Part B. Thf:
name of Heriberto Esquivel is found on Exhibit I, Part
B, indicating that he had not interven0d as of that time.
(R. 232-41.) There were no interventions after that time.
Part of the court's sixth finding of fact if' not supported by the evidence. The evidence is clear that the
Constitution of the BLF&E itself conditions paymrnt of
strike benefits and prohibits the granting of strike benefits to members not in the bargaining unit represented
by the union. (Exhibit P-1, pages 195 through 199; R.
781-82.) Further, there is evid0nce in the record in
this case that organizers of defendants did condition
strike benefits offered to plaintiffs as provided in the
Constitution of the BLF&E. (Exhibits D-152; D-160:
D-162.)
In addition, as shown by Exhibit D-190, most of the
plaintiffs had already become membE'rs of th<:> BLF&E
prior to the time any representations were made by anyone regarding strike benefits regardless of the outco111l'
of the election. The evidence indicates that said rrprrsentations were not made until sonu_• time h<>h\'Pen FPhruary 1 and March 24, 1967. (R. 697-98; R. 857: R. 891.l
Thus, these representations are wholly irr<>lt•\·ant and
6

irnuiati>rial
to all plaintiffs
had joined previous
10 that timP and cannot be the hasis of any recovery here.
mnnlwr six is not supported hy evidence
,r]wn' it states that representations were made by autlwrized representatives of defendants. These represPntations \\'Pre devised solely hy L. L. Iman. There
is not a scintilla of evidence in this record to indicate
:rn_\' aetnal authority of Iman to make any promises inconsish·nt with the Constitution of the BLF&E. The
tr:"timon:· of President Gilbert is clear on the fact that
Iman was a field representative and was empowered only
to f'Pll
and solicit members. (R. 724.) He was
not (·llq>owered to interpret the Constitution of the
BrothPrliood, nor was he empowered to make promises
ultm riff,· the Constitution of the Broth(='rhood. (R. 761.)
Constitntion of the BLF&E, Article 16. (Exhibit P-1.)
Any so-ealled authority which he possessed was, by his
own admission, based upon his own notions and ideas
of \rhat sltonld he done (R. 1159-61; 1176.) Even the
P\'idence of plaintiffs in this action proves this. Mr.
'T'rnjillo, one of the plaintiffs and formerly a special
gr·neral organizer for the Brotherhood, indicated in his
tP8timony that he suggested to Mr. Iman the use of the
word ''gnarantee" since "these peope" had r(='Ceived so
many promises they "are sick and tired of promises."
Mr. Iman then proceeded without authority from the
Grand Lodge to use the word "guarantee" in his fliers
and im;tructffi the special general organizers to use
this term in their solicitation. (R. 1100.) This evidence
dearly shows that Iman was taking instructions from
no onp in the Grand Lodge, but had simply taken unto

7

himself the authority to make these prornist'S and guar
an tees. (R. 1160-62.) There is no evidence to the. con
trary to be found in the record.
The seventh finding of fact entered by the comi.
below is in error in holding that plaintiffs Gene A.
Beck, D. P. Bennett, Glen Bennett, Carter, James, Kendrick, Tsutsui, Gale and T. N. Turner were indncf'd by
or relied upon any offers or representations or gnarantees of defendants. These plaintiffs did not apvear at
trial, they did not testify, they did not answer intrrrogatories of defendants, and further, they were specifically
excluded from a stipulation entered into by counsel for
both plaintiffs and defendants regarding evidence of a
contract and evidence of reliance. In this stipulation,
found in the record at pages 1060 through 10G2, the
parties stipulated to certain evidence in order to shorten
the time of the trial. At that time Mr. Rooker, connsfl
for plaintiffs, made the following statement:
The foregoing stipulation does not apply to
testimonv that would be adduced from the follmrplaintiffs if they were called: Gene A.
Beck, D. P. Bennett, Glen Bennett, Carter, .James,
Kendrick, Tsutsui, Gale and T. N. Turner.
As the record stands, it is completely devoid of any
evidence whatsoever with regard to these plaintiffs.
Thus, there is absolutely no basis in evidence for finding
of fact number seven made by the trial court aR it
applies to these plaintiffs.
Them is no evidence whatever in the record to
support finding number eight as it relates to a contract

8

plaintiffs Gene A. Beck, D. P. Bennett, Glen Beniwit, Carter, J arnes, Kendrick, Tsutsui, Gale and T. N.
'l'nnwr for the same reasons set forth in the immediately
prec(•ding paragraph.
, 11 t [1

Further, with regard to all plaintiffs, the court's
finding of a contract in this case must have been on
rither one of two theories. First, the facts indicate that
hrtween September, 1966, and February 1, 1967 (at
tlrn rarliest, and possibly as late as March 24, 1967),
organizPrs of the BLF&E solicited members making
promises, including promises of strike benefits based
upon the Constitution of the BLF&E. There is no evidencr of any other representations as to strike benefits
dnring this time. If any offer was made to constitute
a contract based upon the BLF&E Constitution, these
promises must be considered the off er and joining the
BLF&E must be considered the acceptance.
The second possible theory of contract must be
that a contract was entered into which is not based
upon the BLF&E Constitution. According to the evidrnce, such an off er could be construed from the statements made from and after February 1, 1967, and possibly as late March 24, 1967. (R. 1181; R. 1060-62; R.
889-92.) At that time, some of those people solicited
were promised strike benefits regardless of the outcome
of the NLRB election. Authority for such an offer cannot be found within the Constitution of the BLF&E. Acceptance of this offer by joining the BLF&E (if it could
be a basis for a contract action against the Brotherhood)
would apply only to those members who joined as a
9

result of the offer. Members '.Vho joined prior to 111 1'
above dates ean in no way be said to havP aecPpted tlll,
offer made after they joined. Hence, nnd('J' tl1is eoii.
tract theory, only those members who joined afhr t]i 1,
offer was made can rely upon it as a basis for contrcir-.
tnal recovery. rrhe dates of membership of each of
plruntiffs in this action are set forth on the exJ1ihit intro.
duced through Martin Jens en and accepted in <'vidr,nce
as Exhibit D-190.
From the above, it can be seen that finding mm1.
ber eight entered by the court cannot possibl>· hP based
upon the evidence. If the contract is based 11pon th1,
Constitution of the BLF&E, then the plaintiffs arP also
subject to the rest of the proyisions of the Constitution
which do not allow recover>·· BLF&R Constitution
10, Section 3(a); Article 10, Section 3(e), (ExJ1ihitP-l,
pp. 195-97). If the contract is based upon the unconditional guarantee allegedly made by agents of defendants, then only those who joined the union after this
promise was made can recover. All of the plaintiffs could
not possibly recover since most of them joined the union
prior to the time of this latter promise.
The schedule attached as Exhibit B (plaintiffs' Exhibit P-54 herein) to the court's finding number nine can
have no relevance unless the court adopts a contraet
theory based upon that document and similar
The evidence clearly shows that the document was not
distributed and the promises we re not made until after
February 1, 1967. (R. 889-92; R. 1060-G2; R. l 181.) An»
such promises, including the promise made in
B
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attaclt<·11 to findi11µ; mrn1hn r:irn· ('an only apply to those
or tlt<· BL F&E 1"110 joim·cl from and after
pjil'oXi11ta t<·ly F<'l1nrnry 1. 19(i7. 1-'hey havP no rele8
\<1lH'P wliatsoe\·pr \\·ith res1>ect to those members who
in·rP already in the union at that tinw. Thus, such promC"annot lw tlw basis for recovery herein as to those
plaintiffs.
Tlw finding mad<' by the lower court in its finding

nnmlwr tPn is contrary to the uncontradicted evidence in
this rrcorcl. Tlw only person in the organization of the
DLr'&E anthorized to approve a strike is its president.
Constitution of the BLF&E, Article 9, Section 16; Article
Si>dion ::20(.i); (Exhibits P-1.) He testified that he
('UllPd n strib· of tl10sP mPn in the bargaining unit reprehy the BLF&E ( R. 79-1-95). He furtlwr testified
that llnd<·r the union law he had no authority to call
a strih of pc·ople who were not represented by the
BLF&
11 lw t>vidt>nce clParly shows that plaintiffs in
this action were not and neYer have been represented
bY the Brotherhood. (R. 1123-24.) The evidence shows
that
authority to strike granted plaintiffs in this
;1dion 1rns granted by the Mim•-Mill union which represented t!H•m at thP time. (R. 1223-24.)
Tlw court's fincling numbt>r twelve is contrary to
tlw P\ i<lrnce in that it states that the strike benefit payroll of .T uly, 1967, which included the plaintiffs, was a
rnli(l and duly-authorized payroll. The uncontradicted
c•rideneP dPmonstrates that this payroll was invalid becausp it containt>d names of people not in the bargaining
nnit rt>presented by the defendants contrary to express
11

instructions givn to Martin Jensen by letter of July• 2:J,
1967, and also contrary to express instructions found on
the bank payroll forms npon which the payroll was suli.
mitted. Both this letter and the instructiorn-; on the
forms indicate that only names of men in the bargainging
units represented by the BLF&E should be included on
the payroll. (Exhibits P-78 and D-191.)
U ncontradicted testimony of Martin Jensen, Secre.
tary of the Local BLF&E, indicates that he placed plaintiffs' names on this payroll knowing they were not lllPlllbers of the bargaining unit represented by the BLF&E
and further that he placed these plaintiffs in erronE'Ons
job classifications so as to include them on the payroll.
(R. 1145-46.) This payroll was held to be invalid h!'
the president of the BLF&E for these reasons. This was
his duty under the Constitution of the BLF&E.

The court's finding number fourteen is in Prror because it is contrary to the evidence in Pxhibit form which
indicates that plaintiffs were not com1wlled to seek outside employment by any act of defendants, Lnt were
compelled to seek outside employment by the Constituti on of the BLF&E in Article 10, Section 3 (i).
P-1, pp. 197-98.)
Finding number fifteen entered by the court hdow
is contrary to the evidence since undisputed evidence
from the records of the BLF&E shows that plaintiff
Oliver was never a member of the BLF&E. (I£xhibit D190; R. 924; R. 932; R. 938.) Further, the nndisputerl
evidence in the case shows that membPrs of the BL1',&E
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1

1

hnrµ;nininµ; unit represented by the BLF&E do
not t·njoy the same benefits of memh<'rship as do members
wJio an' in a bargaining unit
by the BLF&E.
(R. rn:1-R-1; ExJ1ibit P-1.) Thus, these plaintiffs were
not entitk·d to all of the benPfits available to members
of the BLF&E in a bargaining unit represented by the
BLF&E.
not iJl a

Findng number sixteen by the court below is entirely
without supporting evidence with regard to whether
strike bent>fits were knowingly paid by defendants to
mm ontside of the bargaining unit represented by the
BLF&K The evidt>nce indcates that some of the men
on tlw strike payroll may have been listed in erroneous
joh cla:-:sifiC'ations and in this respect may have received
hendits wlwn they should not have received them. (R.
920; 926-27.) There is no evidence, however, to indicate
that the BLF&E knowingly paid strke benefits to anyone
outside of a bargaining unit which it represented.
ThE>re is no evidence in the record to support the
court's fnding number seventeen. Plaintiffs at no time
introdnced any competent evidence with respect to out::-idt> Parnings of other people who had been paid strike
lwnefits. Further, plaintiffs introduced no competent
evidence respect inquiry made by the Grand Lodge as
to outside earnings of those members receiving strike
benefits during the strike. In addition, there is clear
evidPnce found in Exhibit P-1 that the defendants had
110 duty to make any inquiry with regard to strike benefits
and that the duty to disclose earnings rested upon each
inuividual member of the BLF&E. Constitution BLF&E
Article 10, Section 3(i), (Exhibit P-1, pp. 197-98).
13

This court should be aware that finding
eighteen originally entered by the trial court wati inodi.
fied and practically vitiated by that conrt's additionui
finding of fact. The additional finding of fact indicati·!
that defendants introduced into evidence the interroga
tories ans'.vered by most of the plaintiffs, which inter
rogatories indicate the amount of earnings of each plain.
tiff during the period of the strike. vVith respect to
plaintiffs who did not answer the interrogatories, it
the position of defendants that they cannot recover Pnn
if the court upholds the judgment below sincP it is
sible to compute the correct amount of said recowry.
Parts of finding number nineteen are conclusorv
and clearly not supported by the evidence. There is no
evidence in this record whatsoever which would indicate
that defendants had any fiduciary duty to pay strikr
benefits to these plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' whole theory of
this action has been contract. Any fiduciary duty would
have to come from the Constitution of the BLF&E (Exhibit P-1) which also contains provisions which prohhit
the payment of strike benefts to these plaintiffs. Tha.t
Constitution clearly creates a form of discrimination in
the administration of strike funds, since it requires payment of strike funds to people participating in a "legal
strike authorized by" the union and it forbids payrnPnt 1if
strike benefits to all others, whether members or not.
Constitution of the BLF&E Article 10, Section 3(a),
(Exhibit P-1, p. 195.) See also Exhibit D-136
at pp. 19-20 infra.
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ln its J'ncling n11mlwr twe>nt>, tl1P court finds a breach
111 · i'idtwian, dnty hmsed r:pon its finding that promises
11 ,,n• iuade to plaintffs by defendants wlwn deft>ndants
that these pro mi :,;es WP re false and that they
11 di
ironld not pay benefits. This finding is clearly contra
to tlw e\·idence in this case. There is no evidence whatev<'l' in the record that defendants or their employees ever
kne\\' at the time these alleged unconditional promises
11 pre made that they would not be kept. The evidence
ekarl.v shows that the organizer who initiated the promj,es, L. L. Iman, thought his interpretation of the BLF&E
Constitution was correct. (R. 1175-76.) The evidence is
nncontradicted in its showing that the Grand Lodge offirrrs of thP BLF&E did not know these alleged unconditiunal promises were being made until well after they had
J,epn made and tlw strike had begun and the plaintiffs had
shown hy plaintiffs' own evidence when one of their
11·itm'sses, Mr. Tn1jil10, stated that he was asked to
gather up fliers after the strike had begun to send to
PrrsidPnt Gilbert to show him what went on out here.
(R. 1142-43.)
Finding number twenty-one entered by the court below
is nrnmpported by the evidence since the evidence is insuffieiPnt to support a judgment on behalf of alleged plaintiff Esquivel (he is not a plaintiff) or on behalf of
alleged plaintiff Oliver (he was not a member of the
BLF&E at the time of the strike). Alleged plaintiffs Gene
A. Beck, D. P. Bennett, Glen Bennett, Carter, James,
Kendrick, Tsutsui, Gale and T. N. Turner have produced
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no evidence whatsoever indicating any contract of ani
kind between them and the BLF&E and fnrther
have produced no evidence showing any reliance upo;1
promises made by the defendant BLF&E or any damaKe
incurrt>d because of breach of contract or because of said
reliance. Since these items are not "common questions"
which can be· proved for all by some members of
class, failure of these plaintiffs to adduce proof is fatal
to their case.
Since the crucial findings of fact upon which the
judgment below is based are not supported by evidence,
the judgment below should be reversed and the case
should be remanded for findings consistent with the evidence.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT A VALID CONTRACT WAS ENTERED INTO
BY PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS BECAUSE,
AS A MATTER OF LAW, ANY "CONTRACT" FOR
STRIKE BENEFITS TO THESE PLAINTIFFS WAS
ULTRA VIRES THE UNION CONSTITUTION AND
CANNOT BE BASED UPON ANY AGENCY,
PLIED AUTHORITY, APPARENT AUTHORITY OR
RATIFICATION THEORY.

Article 10, Section 3, sub-section (a) of the Constitution of the BLF&E provides :
The rate of pay to each member and non-member engaging in a legal strike authori.zed by this
organization shall be ....
The terms "legal strike authorized by this organization" are words of art as mwd in the context of labor-
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wgellH'nt n'1atlons. Sl'etion S(h)-4(ii) (c), 29 U.S.C.
'.]CJ,C.:(ll)(4)(ii)(c), of th(' National Labor Relations Act
as mnend('d iirovides tliat it is an nnfair labor practice
to fore<-' or reqmre

1<
11 11

... an)- ernplO_\'C'l' to recognize or bargain with a
particular lahor organization as the representative of his (_•mplo_\-ees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of
sueh em1iloyt'Ps under the provisions of Section
159 of this title . . . . (Emphasis added.)
Srction !)(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.

provides:

H<·presrntativcs designated or selected for the
1mrpose of eo1lcctive bargaining by the majority
of tl\(' l'lllployePs in the unit appropriate for such
1mrposes, shall be the exclusive representatives
of all tlw Pmployees in such unit for the purposes
of rolkctiv(' barganing in respect to rates of pay,
wag1's, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment .... (Emphasis added.)
Aftrr the certification election in June of 1967, the Mine,
Mill and Smelter vVorkers Union, not the BLF&E, was
thP exclusive representative of plaintiffs for the purIJoses of collective bargaining concerning the terms and
eon<litions of employment. (R. 1224.) The economic strike
authorization and call issued by the BLF&E on July 15,
19G7, was for the purpose of achieving better terms and
conditions of employment for only those persons under
thr jurisdiction of the BLF&E. (Exhibit D-186; R. 12221224.)
As set forth in Section 8 (b) ( 4) (ii) ( c) above, any coneertrd action on the part of a labor organization attempt17

mg to force or require an employer to bargain with
that organization ·when another labor organization ha,
been certified as representative of that unit is an nnfair
labor practice. NLRB v. Teamsters, 314 F.2d 792 (hi
Cir. 19G3); Parks v. Atlanta Printing Pressmen, 2±3 F. 2,!
284 (5th Cir. 1957). Conseqtwntly, if the BLF&E \reri·
to authorize or call members not within its bargainino
unit, but within a unit held hy l\fine-1\fill, out on strike, it
would be in express violation of this section and an
illegal strike. NLRB v. Teamsters, supra; Park v. At
lanta Printing Prcssnien, supra; Local 48, Slzce.t Metal
Workers v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d G82 (5th Cir. 19G4).
The BLF&E cannot use strike coercion to effect
terms and conditions of employment of employees it does
not represent. Plaintiffs were never represented by thP
BLF&E. (R. 1223-24.) Hence, the BLF&E Constitution,
when it speaks of a "legal strike" authorized by thP
BLF&E cannot be said to encompass plaintiffs in the
instant case. If plaintiffs were called out or anthorized
to strike by the BLF&E, it would not be a legal strike, hut
would be an unfair labor practice under the National
Labor Relations Act as amended. This is the srm:e in
which the International President, therefort>, properly
defined those constitutionally entitled to strike benefits.
rrhis is entirely within his power and authority.
Plaintiffs argue that this provision entitled them
to strike benefits even though they were not within
bargaining unit represented by the BLF&E.
claim
that the fact that they are members of the BLF&E
entitled them to the benefits. Plainly, this cannot be
18

tlw correct inkrJll'C'tabon of this section of the ConTlw Constitution authorizes pay to members
!/!Ill 11 011-mr'1111Jcrs Pngaging in a "leg((l strike aidhoricr If"
the organization. There were thousands of nonrnr•mbr:rs ontside the bargaining unit represented by the
nLF&E l'ng·ag·ing in the same strike plaintiffs engaged
in. Tf tlw interpretation placed upon this section by plaintiffs >vere correct, thP BLF&E would also be liable to
eyen· one of them. Such an interpretation would place
the RLF&E under contractual obligation to pay strike
lwnefits to
employee of Kennecott. Analysis rewals thr absurdity of plaintiffs' proposition. The intent
of the BLF&E Constitution was clearly to limit strike
henefits to those in a unit represented by the union and
owT which the union had control. (R. 783-790.)
This is the> interpretation which has been placed
npon this article of the Constitution by those entitled to
interprPt it tlw officials of the International Union and
the Constitutional Convention of the Brotherhood. The
Jll'0ceedings of the 33rd through the 39th International
Conventions of the BLF&E show the clear intent of the
HLF&E constitutional provision on strike benefits. As
an example, during the 37th Convention (1959) an amendment was proposed by Lodge 247 which would have provided the following:
rrhe rate of pay to each member and non-member engaging in a legal strike authorized by this
organization shall be .... SAME TO INCLUDE
ANY TIME LOST BY A MEMBER ON ACCOUNT [Sic] HONORING A PICKET LINE
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\VHERE A srrRJKE IS IN PROORES:S p.
of tlw :nth Con_vention (1959)
(Exlnb1t D-13G.) (Emphasis added.) ( AJnl·ndatr.
. i 1zed.)
·
Jl \
1anguage capita
·
Ob\riously, this proposed anwndrnc'nt would havr·
applied to the plaintiffs in the instant case, since thry
were, in fact, members honoring a picket line where
strike is in progress as far as the BLF&E ·was eoncerned.
Hov\rever, since this provision, in classifying those
for strike benefits, speaks of a ''legal strike authorized
by this organization" and the anwndment would proyide
benefits for membPrs honoring a picket linr ·wlH·re a
strike is in progress, it is clear that such a clnal elast1ifaa.
tion was not previously recognized. This proposed amend
ment was rejectPcl (Exhibit D-13G at p. 392) and it is
therefore certain that the Conn'ntion did not
to pay
strike benefits to people not anthoriztid to strike hy the
BLF&E. (The position of plaintiffs in this casti).
In the same iConYention, another arnend11wnt wa'
proposed by Lodge 810:
\VHEN A MEMBER JS DISMISSED FIWM
THE SER\TICJ£ OF ANY RAILROAD ... BE
CAUSE OF HIS DECISION TO HONOR THE
PICKET LINES OF ANY UNION WHOSl'
MEMBERS ARE ON A LEGAL STRIKF. HE
SHALL BE
rro RECELYE COMPENSATION UPON rrHE
BA8IN
IS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH (a) TH1S
SECCJ1 ION, GOVERNING p A y M 1£ NT OF
STRIKE
DUHING AN AUTHORIZED STRIKE. Prnceecling-::s of the ?i7tlt Convention (1959) at :395-!JG. Exhibit D-1 :11;. (Emadded.)
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tl1 is proposed mrn,ndment would have granted
lwnrl'ii ,, to tl10s<' honoring pickd 1in<'s where the picket
\\'t•re s<•t np hy a union
in a legal strike.
Om·<'
the drafters of this amendment made a disti 11 cti on hehn'en uwm hers on a legal strike (in the bargaining nn it r<:>presented hy the striking union) and members 11onoring a picket line. Ths distnction was clearly
intcndPd to provide strike benefits in a situation apart
from tlw normal "authorized" strike-benefits situation.
Since the amendment was rejected, (Exhibit D-136, at
p.
it ne>cessarily follows that the Convention did not
1risb to pay strike benefits for the honoring of picket
lines and intended such benefits to be limited to those in
a bargaining unit represented by the union and engaging
in a strikt> anthorized by the Brotherhood. Based upon
tliis 11istory, President Gilbert was constrained to inter]Jl'et Rt'ction 3 of Article 10 so as to exclude payment to
plaintiffs.
lliw(' irtoJ'('

Umler the indisputably correct interpretation which
the Conventions and the International President placed
upon the BLF&E Constitution, it would be ultra vires
the power of the union under its Constitution for its
officers to pay strike benefits to those not within a
bargaining unit it represents. If such strike benefits
could not be paid by the union without a Constitutional
amendment, the union certainly cannot be said to have
ratifie(l any activity of its purported agents in making
this off er. Neither could there be an implied authority
o[ thesp agents to make the alleged offers nor an apparent
since agents of the union could never be
said to have more authority than the union itself has.
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This particular issue has bet>n prescntPd in sen·i:il
cases, the first of whirh is Brotherhood of' B" 111·1 I .. .
Traimncn v. Barnhill, 214 Ala. 565, 108 So. 43G (192fl).
In the Barnhill cast>, after a prolonged strike, thP 1m,j.
dent, the general secretary and the treasurer of the union
decided to terminate the strike> bPnefits on tJw grounrl
that such benefits were bankrupting the union. Plaintiff
thereupon sued the union to recover his strike benefits.
The constitution there involved provided for payment
of strike benefits under sworn statements showing the
names, occupations and length of service ''rith the company to all men "under the jurisdiction" of the lodw·
engaged in the strike. A further section of the constitution provided that the president, the general secretary
and the treasurer, in conjunction with the vice-president
in charge of the strike and the board of trustees, had
the power to suspend payment of any strike benefits.
The court, after much discussion on the subject, concluded that:
1)(1(1

[T]he power through the prov1s10ns of the
brotherhood law to make the decision of their own
officials and tribunals conclusive in respect to the
extraordinary protective fund and all its shikP
benefits under its law . . . is conclusive on the
members, no fraud being charged.
Thus, the constitutional provision making the decision
of the authorities of the union conclusive as to strike
benefits was held valid. See Annotations 47 A.L.R. 282,
125 A.L.R. 1260.
In the case of United Brotherhood of Carpenters if;
Joiners of America, v. ]Jfoore, 141 S.E.2d 729 (Ya. A. Ct.
App. 1965), a member of a local union brought an aetion
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llw brotherhood and the local union alleging that

Ile· was promised that if lw 1rnnld engage in a strike
agaiust his <·rnployer the organizations would pay all his
111 ,ressary bills during the srike. In the lower court, the
plain ti ff was granted a verdict and the union appealed.

was testimony in the case that a certain Mr.
:McKinney had made promises to the employees that all
of their bills would be rmid if they would engage in a
strike against the employer. McKinney was a representative of the brotherhood sent to aid the local in the strike.
The plaintff claimed that McKinney was merely the
alter-ego of the president of the brotherhood. His credentials card was signed by the president of the brotherhood
and the card stated that McKinney was a representative
of th(' president. The dnties of McKinney included organizing, negotiating contracts, settling grievances and arbitrations. Dnring one of the local meetings, McKinney
was asked about benefits in case of a strike. It was here
that he allegedly made the promise that the union would
takP care of any bills the members had. There was furthPr testirnony by the plaintiff that McKinney made it
plain that "he was the boss of the thing."
After commencement of the strike, McKinney, along
with people from the local union filled out and mailed,
in accord with the constitution, the strike payroll. The
international sent a certain amount of money to the local
for distribution. This money was distributed and plaintiff recPived strike benefits in the amount of approximately $300.00. However, he alleged that this was not
rnfficient to cover his bills and expenses incurred. As
the
continued, the local asked for more money and
it was denied these funds by the international. The court
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concluded that there was sufficient evidencp introdnf'irl
as to tht> question of the promise made by M('Kimit:
to uphold a jury verdict. However, the controlli 11 y qne.,_
ion was a question of law: Whether M cK in11cy had 111,,
authority to bind the lJrothcrhood in this manner.
court held that the brotherhood, being a \"oluntary umncorporated association, the rights and privileges and
obligations and duties of the association and its rnembets
must be found in its constitution and laws. Plaintiff
alleged that the reference in various provisions of the
constitution to strike pay and strike benefits indica!P<l an
implied power to promise such benefits. HmrPver, the
provision of the constitution relied upon stated:
"In the case of a strike or lock-out, wlwre immediate aid is required, the General President, General Secretary and General Treasurer shall he
vested with power to appropriate such sums as, in
their j1ldgment, they deem advisable to meet tl1t
particular demands, and until such time as tlw
General Secretary can act upon the same throng-11
correspondence with the General Krccuticc
Board." (Italics by the Court.)
Under this provision, the court concluded that tlw
officers, jointly, could act and grant and prowise strike
benefits. However, the court conclndPd tl1e officers conld
not act alone. Therefore, since the presid0nt
could
not have granted or validly promised strike benefits,
representative could not be said to have any authority.
either direct, implied or apparent, to make such
Hence, the appellate court reversed the lower court for
refusing to strike plaintiff's e\·jdence on tlte ground that
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111 pb\1t1 i [' had not prov(·d t1iat
had authorit>' (o rnab• t1w lll'orni:-;('s C'lai11H•d hy plaintiff.
1

TIY .lfoore casP is V('ry analogous to the instant case.
l f, in fad, Iman

the prnrnisvs which plaintiffs' evid(•lJC'(' irnli('atPs he rna(h•, tlH' controlling question is a
qn(':-:tion of' law: \Vhdher Iman had authority to bind
tlw Broth(']'hooc1 in that manner. As set forth above at
pag'(•s 1±-J 3, the BLF&E Constitutional Convention and
Pre:-:ident Uilhert had interpreted the Constitution so as
to dPny lwndits to persons in the position of tlwse plaintiffc;. (Exhibit P-78; Exhibit D-191.) Since even the
Tnkrnat!onal Presi(k•nt could not bind the union by promiRing lwrn·fits to plaintiffs when they '''ere not represent!'<l hy the BT_,F&E, it is clear that Iman, an agent the
l'i 1·si(lrnt a p1winted, conld have no such authority, expn·ss, apparent, or implied; and it is equally clear that
rnch a prnrnisP could not be ratified by the Grand Lodge.
In tlH• ease of Amalqamated Clothing Workers of
Americo 1.'. Kiser, 17-± Ya. 229, 6 S.E. 2d 562 (1939),
the \'irginia Supreme Court held that where the union
eonstitnbon did not expressly authorize the union to
mah a contract to pay wages to a member who should
lose employment because of the union, any alleged contract made by the union's agents in order to induce a
member to join was invalid. In the [(is er case, an organizer for the union allegedly promised plaintiff that if
she lost her employment due to the fact that she joined
tliP union, th<' union would pay her certain benefits. Plaintiff joinl'd the union and lost her employment. For a
Ct'l'tain time the union did pay her some benefits. How-
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ever, at a later date sl1e was notified she would not
receive any further payments. Thereupon, she instituter]
a proceeding by filing a petition of attachment on unir!ii
funds. The controlling issue was whether or not thp
union had the power to make these promises and, hence,
could grant authority for such promises to its agents.
The court stated that it had searched the constitution
of the union and had found no authority for the promises
made in this case. It further stated that:
All rights, privileges and duties of both the association and its members must be found in the
constitution. We are not permitted to look elsewhere for them.
The Court went on to state that the principal-agent role
that an agent in discharge of his duties within the scope
of his authority, whether that authority is express or
implied, are obligatory upon the principal without ratification or assent on the latter's part does not apply in
the case of unincorporated associations. The court stated:
That rule has no application here because we are
considering an association, not formed or existing
for profit and one which has very limited powers
prescribed in a definite clear, unambiguous constitution. It is a democratic instrument and
affords to all who subscribe, equal rights, privileges and duties. No one is entitled to a greater
right or privilege than his brother member. From
such an instrument inferred or implied powers
seldom arise as is attested by this apt language
in International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers i.
B. L. Wood, 162 Va. 517, 175 S.E. 45, 58:

"* * * The doctrine of authority implied from

ostensible authority has a very iimited applica-
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tion a:-; lwtween snch an order and a person who
is
rnernh,Tship in or claims to be a member
of it."

1'11e eonrt further stated that the plaintiff was bound
b!' the constitntion of the association and became so
honnd when she signed the application card. The court
held that plaintiff was charged with a knowledge of the
limited authority of the officers and agents of defendant
based upon the contractual nature of the constitution.
In addition, the court held that:
A person applying for membership in a fraternal-benefit association is charged with the duty
of acquainting himself with its constitution and
and, in the absence of fraud, is conclu:-;iv<'ly }JI'('snm0d to know the qualifications for
membership therein prescribed and the limitations
thereby imposrd upon the power and authority of
its officers, and upon subordinate lodges and their
officers as its agents. (Emphasis added.)
Tlw eonrt eoncluded that there being no power in the
constitution of defendant authorizing it to enter a contraet with plaintiff for payment to her of benefits, such
a contract could not be validly made. The court held
that plaintiff:
is hound to have known of the absence of authority
in tlw constitution. The defendant itself not having the power to make the contract, its agents
u1011,ld have no implied authority to do what the
principal itself is not empowered to do. (Emphasis
added.)
This rule also applies to the doctrine of ratification.
A contract can only be ratified by the person who had
the power to authorize it.
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Further exponnding upon the conf'titntion of tlii·
union in that
the court held that in addition tri
being a contract betwePn plaintiff and the union,
constitution was a contract between plaintiff and the
other members of the union. The fund which ,,.as de.
rived from the other members of the association by dues
and assessments was paid to the union as a trust fund.
It could not be paid out except by virtue of the constitu.
tion. The court held that looking behind the association
as an entity, the fund really belonged to all of the, mem.
bers. Therefore, to permit plaintiff to collect wages as
she alleged, wonld be taking money from the fund belonging to all members of the union without consent of
said members.
As stated in the Kiser case, sitpra, every mernher of
the union is bound by the constitution as a contractual
obligation and is chargeable with knowledge and understanding of its provisions. E.g. Allen v. Southern Pacific
Co., 166 Or. 290, 110 P.2d 933, 935 (1941); Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Kiser, supra. Article 10, Section
3 ( e) of the BLF&E Constitution provides that the provisions concerning strike benefits are directory only and
cannot be the basis for a legal liability on the part of the
Brotherhood. Under this provision, the members who
joined supposedly in reliance upon the promises of strike
benefits were, not reasonable in their reliance. They
were charged with knowledge that such provisions could
not create legal liability Since union members are bound
to know and have accepted the provisions of the Constitution, they cannot now repudiate this specific provision
while trvinoto rely on another provision pnrporteclly
•
b
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,,r:rnting th<'m benefits.

b

They must accept the whole

Co11sti tn b on.

UndPr tJw cases cited above, it is clear that the
eonstitntional and contractual obligation involved in the

at bar prevents, by operation of law, any recovery
by plaintiffs in the instant case. Since, under the Constitution, the president himself could not authorize payment of btmefits to plaintiffs, no one could be said to
have actual, implied or apparent authority to do so.
Further, there could be no ratification of such conduct.

POINT III
NON-PROFIT ASSOCIATIONS SUCH AS LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS ARE ACCORDED SPECIAL
TREATMENT UNDER THE LAW AND THEREFORE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING INTERNAL AFFAIRS ARE CONSIDERED
BINDING ON ALL MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION AND THE COURT SHOULD NOT INTERPRET
A UNION CONSTITUTION WHERE VALID PROVISIONS FOR ITS INTERPRETATION ARE PROVIDED THEREIN.

Expenditures of umon funds may only be made
pursuant to the union constitution. Absent authorization
under tho constitution, any payment of moneys by an
officer of the union vwuld constitute a breach of his
fiduciary duty under the federal Labor-Management ReSee Point IX, infra.
porting and Disclosure Act
Article 10, Section 3, of the BLF&E Constitution providt>s for strike benefits. It further provides that the
final authority to interpret the Constitution resides in
the prPsident, unless he is overruled by the National
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Convention. Const. BLF&g, Article lG, Section l(bJ,
(Exhibit P-1).
Union constitutions, when properly adopted, create
a contractnal relationship between the nnion and its menibers. E.g. Allen v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., supra; Q011_
zales v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 298 P.2d
(Cal. 1956); Lockridge v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street
Electrical Railway and ill otor Coach Employees of America, 369 P.2d 1006 (Idaho 1962); United Glass Worker.1
Local No. 188 v. Seitz, 399 P.2d 74 (Wash. 1965). Mem.
hers are held to have consented to be bound by the rules
and regulations of the union when they join the union.
E.g. Cleveland Orchestra Committee v. Cleveland Federation of Musicians, et al., 303 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1962);
United Glass Workers Local No. 188 v. Seitz, supra.
Plaintiffs in the instant case allege that they have a
contractual right to receive strike benefits pursuant to
the Constitution of the union. It should be noted, however, that they are also contractually bound by all provisions of the Constitution. Article 10, Section 3 of th"
BLF&E Constitution authorizes the payment of strike
benefits to members and non-members engaged in a
"legal strike authorized by this organization."
added.) Article 16 of the Constitution also gives thP
International President authority to interpret the Constitution.
Furthermore, since theConstitution of the BLF&E
creates a contract, plaintiffs are bound by Section :3(e)
of Article 10 which provides that the article on payment
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o!' -Jrike lH·ndits is "rliu:ctory only, and shall 11ot be the

lin-is of ally lial>ility on the vart of the Brotherhood."

(
s added.) Members cannot now create a legal
lwbility where they have agreed none could exist.

In a good-faith interpretation of the Constitution, the
president determined strike benefits could not be paid to
plaintiffs under the Constitution. (R. 784-788.) See discussion supra, at --------· The good faith of this interpretation is shown by actions of prior Constitutional Conventions, discussed, supra, at pp. 12-14.
Additional support for the reasonableness and good
faith of the interpretation of President Gilbert that
strike benefits can only be paid to employees working
nnder the jurisdiction of the BLF&E is found in the
n·rord. Exhibit P-78, admitted into evidence at the
rrqnest of plaintiffs, is the initial strike payroll submitted to the Grand Lodge in this case. This payroll
contains tho names of most of the plaintiffs in this action.
First, attention is directed to the page containing the
of the local lodge officers and that of Mr. E.
BrPhany of the Grand Lodge. On this page is a parap;raph stating:
TAKE NOTICE!
vV11ere chairmen approve pay-rolls for several
lodges, they will be responsible for duplication
of names. They must not approve two pay-rolls
of two different Lodges whereon the same striker
is listed twice. Regardless of what Lodge a striker may be a member, his name should appear on
the pay-roll of the Lodge under whose jurisdic-
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tion he 1ras employed
u.ihcn the strikP
.

7 .,

(Emphasis added.)

11

·

Further, attention is directed to each :shePt of th<·
payroll whereon names of m0mlwrs have heen plaC'td
by the local lodge. Just above these names, in bold-faet
print, appears the following:
To the General SecrPtary and Treasurer, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen:
The following list of names is a coned list of
the names of striking ClllJJloyees wlw u·rre rillploycd under the jurisdiction of this Lod9r in the
service of above-named railway company at the
beginning of this strike on said railway: (Emphasis added.) (Then follows list of names.)
Both of these references makP it nnas8ailable that
the interpretation given the plaintiffs in this ras<> is in
good faith. That same interpretation appears from this
printed document put out by th<> Brotlwrhood prior to
any denial of benefits to plaintiffs. (Exhibit P-78.)
In addition, Exhibit D-191, admittPd in e\·idence at
the request of defendants, supports this eonstruction.
This exhibit is a letter written by R. R. Bryant of the
Grand Lodge to Mr. Martin Jensen, Local Lodge 844
Secretary-Treasurer, on J nJy 25, 19G7. This letter was
also written prior to any denial of benefits to plaintiffs,
even prior to the submission of the strike payroll. Tht·
pertinent part of that letter giving instructions as to
strike payroll states:
The names of all those represented l;.11
IJrotherhood should be listed [on tlw strike
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011r

JHlY-

roll!, provid(•cl
rP:-;ponded to the strike call.
add Pd.)

Tt it-J ohYions from tlie aliovP-citrd exhibits that the
:.;ition taken hy tlw Brotherhood in this case is not
noYel. Plaintiffs ,,·ere not in the bargaining unit repre:o<:>ntecl b.'· defrndants and tlwy should not have been
on the strike vayroll. They were mistakenly listed
11:· tlw secretary of the local lodge nnder erroneous job
classifications. For these rea:sons, the president refused
to allow paynwnt of benefits to them. This was his contitntional dnty and has always been the understanding of
the Brotherhood. Since the constitutional interpretation
rc>ndered to plaintiffs in the instant case was in good
faith and entirely rPasonable, the courts should not interfere with it.

110

ThP right of a labor organization as a voluntary
asso('iation to interpret and administer its rules and
n·gnlations is jnst as sacred as the right to make such
rrgulations, and no presumption against just and corred artion should be indulged. E.g. Louisville & Nashri//p Rail1ray Co. v. Miller, 219 Ind. 389, 38 N.E.2d
i.±2 A.L.R. 1050 cert. denied, 317 U.S. 644 (1941);
Rnrnlwrt v. U11ited Aida Aircraft & Agricitltitral Implem1·11t Workers, 12 N.J. Super. 147, 79 A.2d 88 (1951).
The courts cannot decide the wisdom or propriety of
legitimatP by-laws of a trade union. Dyer v. Occidental
Jjite 111.c:. Co., 182 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1950). The courts
han frlt that they had no right to interfere with a
ruling of a labor organization which was made within
the limits of its constitution even though the court might
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not he of the same opinion as the labor organization rr·.
garding the merits of a controversy. E.g. Loitisvillc d
Nashville Railway Co. v. Miller supra· llf ayo v G·i· .t
'
'
·
•
Pa
Lakes Greyhound Lines, 333 Mich. 205, 52 N.\V.2d 665
(1952).
It has aso been held that union members are bound
by the union constitution and that the courts cannot
resolve ambiguities in the constitution or set aside its
provisions. E.g. Martin v. Favell, 344 Mich. 215, 73
N.W.2d 856 (1955); Pratt v. Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street d!; Electric Ry. Employees, 50 Utah 472, 167 Pac.
830 ( 1917). The mere fact that several officers of tlrn
organization have had differing opinions as to a ruling
on a constitutional issue does not authorize a court to
review the rulings of the regnlarly-constitnted officers
relating to internal affairs. Such a difference of opinion
in interpretation was said to be natural. Allen v. Southern Pacific Co., 166 Or. 290, 110 P.2d 933 (1941); Pratt

v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street d!; Electrical Ry. Employees supra. The courts haye, howeYer, required that
constitutional provisions and by-laws be reasonable and
that they provide a Yalid mode for determining when
relief should be given or denied. When such reasonableness and validity is found, redress may not be sought
in the courts. E.g. Allen v. Southern Pacific Co., supra;
Lang v. International Photo Engravers Union, 343
S.W.2d 385 (Ky. 1960); Sewell v. Detroit Elrctricnl
Contractors' Ass'n, 75 N.W.2d 845 (Mich. 1956); Saint
v. Pope, 211 N.Y.2d 9 (App. Div. 1961).
This issue has been presented and decided in the
state of Utah. In the case of Pratt v. Amalgamated .Ass'n
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o/ Stred d'· Rlcctriwl Ry. Enq;loyr:cc:, 50 Utah 472, 1G7
Pac. 330 (1917), th0 Utah Supreme Conrt held that it was
noL anthorized to review the rulings of the regularlyconstitutecl officers of an association relating to the
intPrnal affairs of that association. This case involved
a suit hy an ex-union member alleging that he had been
arhitrarily and illegally deprived of the right to receive
cPrtain benefits from the union because he had been
arbitrariy and illegally expelled from the union. Plaintiff had been expelled from a Philadelphia local for failure to comply with the transfer requirements of the
llnion. "Whether or not he had been lawfully denied renewal of membership depended upon the construction
given thf' constitution. The opinion of the loweT court,
adopted by the Supreme Court, held that:

'' [rr]he international board did have power, expressly given it in conjunction with the i1JJ.ternational president, to rule upon all questions of
law [and] the manner of construction of the laws
of the association, and did have power to suspend
locals expressly given it by this constitution and
these by-laws." Pratt v. Amalgamated, supra, at
832.
In Pratt, the local which had accepted plaintiff's
memhersl1ip was suspended for this act. The next question asked by the trial court was whether or not this
power of the union had been exercised arbitrarily. Upon
the PYidence presented, the court held that the officers
had acted in good faith and further stated:
"The power given these international [union]
officers is quite arbitrary. I have no doubt it is
necessarv
. ' to the successful maintenance of an

organization
of this sort, that tlH' int<•rnat 1·ona l
..
l
o ff. ieers s 10uld have. very. grrat power and
tarnly, very grPat power is eonf errc>d upon ti :
offieers
the c-onstitution of
association; hut there 1s nothing in the PViden.
in this case that indieates the rwwer was
not in good faith." Pratt ·v. Amalgamated, supra,
at 832.
In sustaining the verdict of the trial eourt that plaintiff
was not entitlt•d to recover, the Supreme Comt stated:
Courts may not interfere with the ads and proceedings of the officers of beneficial sociefas
or asso(•iations to that extent. \Vhat tlw ('Ollrb
are authorized to do and what tl10y will do, in
that regard, is to compel the officers of thr snd1
associations, and the associations
to
condemn no member and not to forfoit his property or his property rights ·without a hearing or
an opportunity to he heard in his ddense aceording to the laws and n1les of the association, and
if there are no such rules the court will imply or
create them. vVhen such an opportunity is given,
however, and the complaining member has been
tried and condemned or has been declared ineligible in accordance with the laws and ru!Ps nf
the order or association, and the acts of the officers of the association in that behalf are fm
from fraud or duress, courts may not interfere.
Pratt v. Anuzlganvatcd, suvra. at 834.
added.)
vVith regard to the construction of th<-' constitution hy thr
officers of the union, the court held:
In any event the officers not only possessed the
right hut it was thefr duty to construe and apply the provisions of the constitution to thP hest
of their understanding- and ability. rrlw fact that
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diffrrent officers have arrived at different conclusions regarding CPrtain provisions of the constitution is but natural. Pratt 1). Amalgamated,
suz;ru, at 83-1.
m,m·t·, it is dear under the Utah law that the court
JtW)- not interfere in tlw legitimate operation of a trade
union, P\'en to the extent of interpreting its constitution
1rherc those interpreting the constitution have done so
in good faith. There is no evidence of lack of good faith
in tlw instant case. The court should not interfere.
'Che Surirenw Court of Oregon, in the case of Allen
I'. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 110 P.2d 933 (1941), refused
to interfere in the interpretation of a union constitution
with rc•spect to settling grieyances and ilisputes between
members. The con rt stated that:

This case, therefore, comes within the well
estahlished rule that, when the constitution and
hr-la\\Ts of an unincorporated, voluntary association, such as the Brotherhood, are reasonable
and valid and provide a mode for determining
\\-hen relief shall be given or denied to its own
members by tribunals provided for therein, re(lress therefor may not be sought in the courts.
Allen v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., supra, at 939.
This intf'rpretation is correct under the policy of labor
law.
ThP officers entitled to interpret the BLF&E Con:-:ti tntion made a good-faith interpretation that plaintiffs
wen· not Pntitled to strike benefits. The trial court erred
in fincli11g eontran- to their interpretation and its judgJtwnt should h<-' n'n•rsed.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT EXHAUST THEIR
INTRA-UNION REMEDIES PROVIDED IN THE
CONSTITUTION AND PLAINTIFFS DID NOT
PLEAD EXHAUSTION OF REMEDY OR AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT.

Before union members can resort to the courts for
relief on intra-union questions, all internal remedies must
be exhausted. E.g. P1ttnani v. Gordon Jensen, Inc., rn
N.W.2d 266 (Minn.1965); Duffy v. Kelly, 91 N.W.2d91fl
(Mich. 1958). This rule has been a development of the
common law of trade associations much the same as
the exhaustion development in federal and state admin.
istrative law. However, in the instant case, relianc8
need not be placed entirely upon the common law, Article
13, Section 9 of the BLF&E Constitution (Exhibit P-1,
p. 251) requires members to exhaust their intra-union
remedies before going to court.
Article 13, Section G(c)-(t>) of the Constitution of
the BLF&E (Exhibit P-1) provides for appeals from
decisions of the International PrC:'sidt'nt. Generally,
appeals can he made to the Board of Directors on an1,
matter properly submitted. However, a decision of tlw
International President interpreting the law of the organization is final unless it is rev<>rsed on appeal a
Convention of the Brotherhood. In the instant case, th•
International President decided that the Constitntion
prohibited payment of strike benefits to plaintiffs. (R.
789.) Plaintiffs' remedy lay in an appeal to the Co1mntion - a remedv which they did not pursm'. (R. 785.i
Therefore, the instant action is not proper. Sec, ('.q.
1
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International Alliance, 306 S.W.2d 64 (Ky.
HlCJ7); Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers,
101 N.\V.2d 782 CWis. 1960).
f-Jriian v.

Casrs construing the exhaustion doctrine are legion.
f)_'he great majority of these cases hold that a union
memLer must indeed exhaust his intra-union remedies
before resorting to the courts. E.g. Lear Sieglar, Inc. v.
International Union of A.A.Ji:!. Workers, 287 F. Supp.
G92 (\V.D. Mich. 1968); Samuelson v. Brotherhood of
Railroad Traimncn, Rocky Mtn. Lodge No. 852, 60 Wyo.
31G, 151 P.2d 347 (1944); Greenwood v. Building Trades
Council, 71 Cal. App. 159, 233 Pac. 823 (1925); Minch v.
Local Union No. 370, Internat'l Union of Operating Engiurers, 44 \Vash. 2d 15, 265 P.2d 286 (1953).
[t hm; further been held that a mere claim of futility
of pursuing internal union remedies will not suffice.
J,ong Island City Lodge 2147 of Brotherhood of Railway
r: 8.8. Clerks v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 217 F.
1-lup11. 907 (1%:3). Furthennore, the provisions in labor
nnion cont\titutions which require the exhaustion of intPrnal rPmedies have generally been recognized by the
courts as contractually binding upon the members. E.,q.
Mooney v. B(irtenders' Pnion Local No. 284, 313 P.2d 857
(Cal. S. Ct. 1957); Minch v. Local No. 370, Internat'l
C11ion of Operating Engineers, sHpra; Gallagher v. Har.
rison, G9 Ohio App. 73, SS N.E.2d 589 (1949); Way v.
11uton, 195 Or. 36, 241 P.2d 895 (1952).

l1011

l'hPr<· nrP, howevPr, some exceptions to the e:xhausl'P<p1in•111ent. It has been held that union members
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m'ed not exlmEst their internal remedies if sud 1 l'<'lll'·l'
. ' ( l f'•
are, in fact, futile or illnsorv.
Er;.
Sc111lor
r • H, 1.1-7.·l //fl.
•
•
..1
11 N.J. 435, 94 A.2d 825 (1953); lValsclu' 1J. Sher/or!,:
110 N.J. Eq. 223, l 59 A. GGl (1932); C1rn 11i119ham r. Jli//,
Dril'<Ts <e Dairy Employees Local No. 584, 148 N.W.2rl
114 (1955).
l

In the instant case, plaintiffs had the right to aJJ]JPal
to the ConYention of the International Union. The Con.
vention was held in July, 19GS (R. 789) and it ·was clear!)·
not unreasonable to require plaintiffs to abide by tlwir
contractual agreement and present their views to this
Convention. Such a right of appeal "Tas not illnson
or futile in view of the fact that the plea to the FinaiirP
Committee (R. 781-82) resulted in a 5 to 3 decision.
(Exhibit P-28.) There is no showing on the record that
such an appeal, if made, would not have received a fair
and impartial hearing by the Convention. It was, there
fore, not an undue burden upon plaintiffs to require them
to first exhaust their intra-union remedy.
Procedurally, the courts are in general agreement
that a member of a voluntary association intending to
sue that association must allege in his complaint for
relief that he has exhausted his internal renwdies and
that the results of that course of action are final. E.g.
Dalton v. Plumbers & Steam Fitters Local No. 60, 122
So. 2d 88 (La 1960); Putnam v. Gordon Jensen, Inc., 1:l9
N .W.2d 266 (Minn. 1965); Taxicab Drivers' Local Umon
No. 889 v. Pittman, 322 P.2d 159 (Okla. 1958); Ilickm(lll
v. Kline, 279 P.2d 662 (Nev. 1955). Such an allegation
is not found jn the instant complaint. (R. 1-19.)
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'Thl' conrts which have n·quired exhaustion have also
require<l that thP plaintiff plead with specificity so as to
dearly indicate that the matter is ripe for adjudication.
Jn other ·words, the mere allegation of exhaustion of
intra-union remedies it not even sufficient to give jurisdidion to a court. E.g. Falsetti v. Local Union No. 2026,
United Mine Workers, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882, 87
A.L.R.2d 1082 (1960); lVax v. Internat'l Mailers' Union,
400 Pa. 173, lGl A.2d 603 (1960). In the instant case
there is no indication in the complaint whether plaintiffs
ltan; ex1rnnstecl tht>ir intra-union remedies. Since these
intra-union remedies ·\\'ere available and have not been
exhausted, this litigation ·was not ripe for decision by
tlw lower court and defendants' motion to dismiss should
Jiave heen granted.
POINT V
DEFENDANTS HA VE NOT WAIVED THE RIGHT
TO LIMIT STRIKE BENEFITS TO THOSE MONTHS
IN WHICH THE STRIKER EARNED LESS THAN
$150.00 FROl\1 OUTSIDE SOURCES, NOR ARE THEY
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THE LIMITATION.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SO
LIMIT BENEFITS GRANTED.

Article 10, Section 3(i) of the Constitution of the
BLF&E provides, in part:
·when a striking member or nonmember receiving strike benefits, is able to earn One Hundred
Fifty Dollars ($150.00) or more per month, it
slwll vc his duty to notify the International
Pn·sident, who shall thereupon request the GenPral Secretarv and Treasurer to remove the individnal 's
from the strike benefit payroll. At
any time during the continuance of a strike, the
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International President mav
require me1nlJer·,
'
.
111·
nonmembers who are receiving strike benefit t
furnish affidavits and other evidence
the exact amount. of their . earnings from oth'e1
emp1oymen t d urmg any given period, and th,
International President shall have authority t
order the withholding of further strike
until the individual has filed the information thu.'
required of him. On sufficient proof to justify
such action, the International President ma 11 a1;_
thorize the discontinuance of payments entirely
to any member or non-member receiving strike
benefits whose earnings from other employnunt
equal or exceed One H wndred Fifty Dollars
($150.00) per month. (Emphasis added.)
This constitutional provision places an explicit duh
on each union member to notify the International Pmi
dent if he is making over $150.00 per month. It also
grants the International President the right to requin,
an appropriate affidavit from members receiving bmfits. This constitutional safeguard provides a means of
conserving the union funds for the payment of strike
benefits to those primarily in need. It also affords protection to the membership inasmuch as a protracted strike
can result in assessment of the overall membership for
the benefit of the striking members. This is a constitntional provision and, as stated in the foregoing pointf', tlw
members of the union are bound contractually by this
document.

By interrgatories to plaintiffs admitted in evidence
(see Additional Finding of Fact by court) the International President has been made aware that many of
plaintiffs earned in excess of $150.00 in some of the
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Any n•covery granted plaintiffs by the
lw.i'cr conrt should have respected this constitutional limita1ion which is there for the benefit of all of the members.
Plaintiffs herein vvish to rely upon the Constitution of
(1 1e BLF&E for henefits, and they must therefore accept
also its burdens. They cannot pick and choose which
constitutional provisions they will abide by.
·ike

,;( 1

There is no evidence in this record indicating
whrther defendants requested earnings information from
those membern receiving strike benefits. Even if this
information was not requested, such action cannot prevent inquiry into plaintiffs' earnings. A custom or practice, even if it were to be so considered, does not bind
the fntnre action of a labor organization in matters governed hy its Constitution.
In the rase of Carey v. International Brotherhood of
I'uzJcrmakers, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N.Y.S. 73 (Sup. Ct.
1924), the plaintiff had run as an incumbent president
of the Paperrnaker's Union but had lost the election.
He brought an action to get a recount and a judicial
dPclaration that he had been elected president. One of
tliP questions at that trial was whether the Board of
Canvassers had properly disallowed the votes from one
parti('11 lar local union. The union constitution provided
that the voting of each local be done at a single meeting.
This provision had been violated by the local in question
in that the voting had been done at more than one
mreting. Plaintiff, nevertheless, contended that the votes
sl1ould b<' counted since a custom had been rstablished
for voting in more than one meeting. The court rejected
43

plaintiff\; contt>ntion and uph<·ld th<' Board of Can.
vasspr's deeision to rej<c•et the votP of this particular loeRI
noting that:
'
_can lw <>stahlislwd
violation of
c1he pr<w1s1ons of th<> Constitnt1on.
Other courts

also l1<·l<l that custom or pradieP <JrH.,,

not :-;up<•rsede the union eonstitution and

F:.ri.

lntenzatioila1 Brotherhood of Hll'Ctrical TVorkl'rs r. c111 :i.
mission on Cicil Rig lits, 1 ±0 Conn. 5:37,
,:\.:.'.(] :Jr;
(195:3); Fritsch 1·. Rarbnck,
l\lisc. 35<1,
748 (Snp. Ct. 1950).
1

;

The courts have indieatPd that aetivitiPs eontra th1
union constitution an• ahsolukly void and cannot hr rali.
dated evPn by the applieation of Pstopp<'l dodrinP. A1111i/-

!Janwted C1nthi11r1 H7 orkers L Ki ...:er, 17.f Ya. 220, rl
S.E.2d 5G2 (1939). In Kiser, agPnts of dPfrndant labor
union had J>l'OllliSPd plaintiff that if s]!P joi1wd the 11nio11
an conseq1wntly lo::-;t lwr job def Pndant would pay lH'r an
amount equal to ht>r regular sahu)·. Plaintiff joined the
union, lost her joh, and tlw union did, in fad, lllah pa1ments to plaintiff for nearly a y0ar.

'I'lw union then

notified plaintiff that it eonld not eontinne 'rith the''
payments. Plaintiff sued tlw nnion basPd upon tlii:; pr0111ise as a contract. In approaching this q1wstion, tl1P rour1
first noted that:
All rights, privileges and duties of hoth the association and its members must be found in tli 11
constitution. \Ve
not pNmitted to look t"bewhere for them.
The court tlwn held that th!:' offic<>rs of th<· union larked
to make such a contract; and, eons('qtwntly, anY
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ao·rnts of the oi'fic(•rs similarly lackPd authority. The
""
rontract,
t]wrdon•, was void. A :;;ignificant fact in Kiser
11 as that tlw practice of making payments to plaintiff
for m·arly a year in no way validatPd the payments. See
Doria 1·. 11ifcrnof'l Union, Allied Industrial Workers, 16
Cnl. Rql. :29, 19G Cal. App. 2d 22 (D.C. App. 1961);
C11 itul Brotherhood of Car7Jenters and Joiners v. Moore,
\'a. (1, 1-11 S.E.2d 7:29 (19G5).

Assnrning- rir_r;1(('11do that labor organizations and
their umstitntions slionld not be treatf•d differPntly from
any otl1n ('()Jltrad, it ,,·ill he found that eve>n under general prin<'iph·s of Pstoppel and \Yaiver the court could
not (lisn'gard tlH· "ontsidP earnings'' constitutional proappli<'al,k· in this case. The requiremt>nts of estoppd an· Si't i'ortli nr:> \Y<>ll in tlw case of Lil!yil'hite v.
'»') .)_
r;9 I) ·"d
11!';'"'
( ,IJ I(/Ill///, -t1 f'J \ .·.
IZ. ,)_,y,
.) / llGO (193r::)
;) ·
•
Tlw Pssential p]eltwnts of an equitable estoppel
]Jp stnkd as follows: (1) there must be a
fol."(' n·1Jre>sPntation or c:oncealment of material
f11rfs; (:2) it must have been made with lrnowlPdp:P, aetnal or ('Onstruetive, of the facts; (3) the
iiart:· to whom it was made must have been without know\('dgl' of or the duty of inquiring further
to t hP rPal faets ; ( +) it must have been made
\1 ith tlw intPntion it should he acted upon; and
th<' party to whom it was made must have
n·liPd on or aeted upon it to his prejudice. There
c-an h<· no to•stoppel if any of these essentials are
al>s(•nt. ( ftalies h.'' the court.)

8 '1 Ilru111Jlo11
1

10±

I'.

Parn11101111t

Pictur('S Corp., 279F.2d100,

l'ir.) cert. dc11ied, :1G-! U.S. 882 (19GO).
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..
It should lw notl•d at tliis point that tl .c· doctrini· di.
1

estoppel is not favored by the courts. Set Beard t'. Jlri
vin,, 60 Cal. App.2d 421, 140 P.2d 720, 726 (194;3); 8tnrk;
v. Bottoms, 203 Tt>nn. 2;37, 310 S.\V.2d 451 (1958). 'l'hi
judicial disfavor of the doctrine is reflected in the pro.
cedural practice of requiring one relying upon estoppe:
to bear the burden of proving all the essential element
Baton Rouge Lumber Company v. Gurney, 173 So. 2d
(La. Ct. App. 1965); Levy v. Bonfouca Him ting Cl11b, 1311
So. 2d 567 (La. Ct. A pp. 1961). There is no t>vidence oi
fraud or concealment of material facts in the rPcord of
the instant case. Further, there is no Pvidence that the
Grand Lodge of the BLF&E had knowledge of fact 1
which would justify an estoppel with regard to the "outside earnings" provision of the Constitution or am
other element of plaintiffs' case. In addition, under thP
cases previously cited, each member who joined th1·
BLF&E is charged with a knowledge of what is contained in the BLF&E Constitution. Amalgamated Clothing Workers i: Kiser, sitprn, at 564. At the very !Pal't.
each member of the BLF&E had the duty of inquiring
into the laws of the Brotherhood. As set forth in the
preceding quote from the BLF&E Constitution, the law
of the Brotherhood is abundantly clear with regard to
this $150.00 per month outside earnings provision. The
members who are now plaintiffs in this snit had knowledge of the facts and therefore cannot make out an
estoppel. As the Utah Supreme Court noted:
One of the essential elements which must enfiir
into and form a part of an equitable estoppel
is that the truth concerning the facts relied upon
by the person claiming the benefits of the estop46

pel was unknown. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57,
:nG Pac. 912, 918 (1928).
The burden of proving a lack of knowledge of the
actual facts or lack of constructive knowledge of the
actual facts foll upon plaintiffs in this lawsuit. Each of
]ilaintiffs either possessed or had access to a copy of the
Constitution of the BLF&E (R. 1060) and should have
]wen aware of its provisions. Even if these members were
not actually aware of the constitutional provisions, they
were all chargeable with knowledge of the laws and
general rult's of the organization which they had joined.
Allen v. Southern Pacific Co., 166 Or. 290, 110 P.2d 923,
(1941); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Kiser,
.mpra.

Not only must the party seeking to claim estoppel
prove the absence of knowledge of the actual facts, but,
as noted in Lillywhite, supra, he must also prove his personal good faith reliance. Such reliance is negated when
the party claiming estoppel has actual knowledge of the
facts, Bradford v. Western Oldsmobile, I·nc., 222 Or.
440, 353 P.2d 232, 238 (1960), or where such party is
in possession of such facts as would put an ordinarily
prudent person upon notice to make further inquiries.
O'Malley 1:. U nitcd Producers and Consumers Co-operahre, Tnc., 95 Ariz. 134-, 387 P.2d 1016, 1018 (1963); Marshall L:. Bfnulict 161 Cal. App.2d 284, 326 P.2d 516, 519-20
m.c. A pp. 1958). Sine<:> plaintiffs had access to facts
which wonlcl have put a rPasonablc person on notice (the
Constitution) they were chargeable with knowledgP of the iiroYisions of the Constitution regarding out47

sid(• earrnngs and tlwy eonld not possibJ_,,· kl\'(' Jiad lli,
good-faith reliancP nPeessary to pstalilisl1 \'stopp(•l. Tlir.
evidence of plaintiffs tlwmselves indicates that tlu.·r.' l·ldfl
actual
of the earnings provision. (R
Each of the plaintiffs had \\·it11in l1is o\rn hands and hi,
own power the facts which would lrnvP
pn·nntr·ri
any reliance on strikt• benPfits where ontsid<'
exceeded $150.00 in any strikt> month. 'l1he eyidenei·
adduced from some of the plaintiffs in tlw ca::w that t] 101
were told by old members of the BLF&E that
11 r11
vision \vas never enforced cannot purport to bind thi·
Brotherhood or serve as the basis for an Psto1ipel. S1"1'
discussion, supra.
Even if constitutional prov1s10ns could lw 1rnifrd,
there is no evidence in this record to show a waiYer k
defendants. The doctrine of waiver is generally defimd
as the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. In
Birkeland v. Corbett, 51 \Vash. 2d 55±, 320 P.2d 635,
(1958), the Supreme Court of \Vashington stated that:
A "waiver" is the intentional and volnntan
relinquishmeint of a known right, or such con
duct as warrants an infere nee of the relinquish·
ment of such right. The person against Khorn a
waiver is claimed must have hlfe11drd to relinquish i:he right, advantage, or benefit, and hi,
actions must be inconsistent with anv other intrn·
tion than to waive them.
added.)
See Constantino v. JJ!oreschi. 9 \Vash. 2d 638, 115 P.2<l
955, 9Gl (1941). These cases indicate that waiver can only
arise when there is a knowing relinquishnwnt. Tlwre ii
aboslutely no evidence in the instant case indicatinp; that
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Uranrl Lodg(• of tl1<• BLF&E or President Gilbert
Lne\I that any of tlw nwmhers of the local who were receiving strih lwnefits
earning in excess of $150.00
per month. Absent such knowledge, there could be no
waiver of the
provision limiting benefits
upon receipt of knowledge as to outside earnings. There
is no evidence in this record regarding whether defendants sought information as to earnings from those members receiving lwnefits. Even if defendants did not seek
information from those members, they are not precluded from limiting plaintiffs here since information
regarding plaintiffs' outside earnings came to the attention of defendants. Custom or practice cannot change a
nnion constitution. SC'e discussion, s1tpra, at 43-44.
tltc'

Siner the Constitntion of the BLF&E requires those

earning in Pxcess of $1f:i0.00 iwr month to be removed
from the strikP rolls by the President, the trial court
c·rrecl in refusing to limit benefits as requested by defendants. For this reason, the trial court should be rewnwd and the ease should be remanded.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS TO CIRCULARIZE POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS TO JOIN THE CLASS.

On :May 9, 19GS, over objection of defendants (R.
221-223), counsel for plaintiffs in this action sent notice
nndPr their firm name and signature to a large nnmber
of pott-ntial plaintiffs who had not intervened. This
nohee reeifrcl approval through an order of the court
Jllll\HH"tedly dat('CT May G, 1968, (R. 224-28) and was
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sent to thirty-six ]Wrsons (H. 2:27-:28). As a n•snlt r
11
this notice, at least ten plaintiffs intnTern:'cl • C1rn 11 }1111
"Notice of .Joinder and Repre:sentation" filed Avril :ill,
1968, (R. 197-206) 'with the final "Notice of .Toindei',dl]1,1
Repn·sentation" filed
24, 1968, (R. 232-41). TJ 1,
suit had b<"en pending for approximately six
at
the time the notice was given and at that time only Bl
plaintiffs had joined. It is apparent that the
ten would not have joined but for the inYitation sent out
by counsel for plaintiffs.
Rule 23 of the Utah Code of Civil Procedure mah,
no provision for notice to be given to potential plaintiff,
This rule follows in substance the old Federal rule which
also provided for no such notice. In the 1968 amendment)
to the Federal Rules, Rn le 23 was changed to allow notice
to be given in certain specified instances. Note>, howewr,
that an explicit change was made in the Federal Rule'
of Civil Procedure according to the legislature authorit1
given to the Supreme Court in the Enabling Act,
U.S.C.A. 2072, 2073). No such dmnge lias heen rnar!P
in the Utah Rules. Consequrntly, an>' snch notice 1rn>
contrary to the Rules, and thus was error on the part
of the trial court.
There are strong reasons of polic>' dietating that any
change in thP Rules of CiYil Procedure should be ma<l1'
according to the normal legislative and judicial chanmb.
Absent such authority, the giving of notice of plaintiffs'
counsel is not free from suspicion. In Cherner 1.:. Tra11sitron Electronics Cor17., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D . .Mass.
Judge 'Vyzanski had the following very iwrtinrnt l'I'·
marks to make about giving notice:
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Ordinarily the primary duty of counsel is to
hi;.: own client. His obligation, like that of hiS'
cliPnt, may in come situations require him to give
notice to other interests which may be adversely
affected by his prosecution of his own client's
of adion. But the bringing o.f the present
s11it, and any preliminary proceedings in connection ·with the taking of evidence prior to judgment cannot legally prejudice other shareholders 1\'110 might be in like case with his own client.
Xu prcccd ent supports the suqgestion that plaintiffs or their counsel have a moral ditty to act
us w1solicited clrnmpions of ·others. Without going so far as to agree with defendant's arguments
that the proposed conduct of the plaintiffs or
their counsel would be champertous or would violate either Canon 27 or Canon 28 of the American
Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics,
this Court concludes that at the present stage of
the controversy (when there is no more reason
to accept as true plaintiff's declaration than defondant's answers) Ride 23 sh01dd not be itsed "as
a dei:icc to rnable client solicitation."
* * * If this Court were to grant plaintiff's
motion, the normal consequence would be that
many persons would incorrectly infer that this
Court regarded the plaintiff's complaint as prima
facie well founded and had required a prompt
notice to all 1vho had been victimized so that they
might not by delay or inaction lose valuable
rights.
***Nor is it any pa.rt of this Court's duty

to awaken anyone who is sleeping through the
[Jf'.riod of limitati.on set by Congress. Moreover,

it would not be appropriate for this Court to
sound the alarm. (Emphasis added.)
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ReP Escott I'. BarChris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp.@,
(8.D.N.Y. 19GS). Allowanep of snd1 solieitation ,,..<1 . ]11)1,
within the discretion of the trial jndg-p' and 1·t \\'()),

.

I

prejudicial error for thP trial judg(' to allow nttnrn'"'
for plaintiffs to solicit additional i1wrnhers of tlw ela«,
to join as p1aintiffs. As stated in Escott v. Brir('/
1118
Const. Corp., supra, at 70G:
The only partieipanh; in tlw pn,sent action 11 1i 11
would benefit by snch a course would he plain
tiffs' att'orneys, who might expect a larger fo,

There i::s no Utah precedent allff\ving· solicitation of
members b:v plaintiffs in a class action. Tlw Rul('S of
Civil Procedure allow no such action. As stated in t]: 11
cases cited, s11pra, sound judicial policy forbids such
action.
For the foregoing reasons, the case should be nversed or at least those plaintiffs who intervened as a
result of the solicitation should not be allowed to recover
in this action.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE MEASURE
OF DAMAGES USED TO COMPUTE THE JUDGMENT.

The proper measure should have been thP damagei
proximately attributable to the plaintiffs' reliance npnn
the actions of defendants' agents.
As the record conclusively shows, the dL•ft'ndants'
employees had no actual authority to bind the union in
contract to pay strike benefits to these plaintiffs. An1

52

of reeovery 11rnst bt> based npon the apparent
anthority of defendants'
to bind the union by
Uwir
The doctrine of ap1mrent or ostensible
anthority is dependent upon the establishment of an
estoppel. Monte Carlo Motors, Inc. v. Volkswagenwerke,
r;.JJ.B.!!., l Cal. Rptr. 920 (Cal. App. 1960); Mi1;rray v.
Hills CalJ Compam1, 198 N.E.2d 46G (Ohio App. 1963);
Zic Television Programs, I11c. v. Associated Grocers, Inc.
of So11tl1 Carolina, 114 S.E.2d 82G (S.C. 1960); Pioneer
Cosuulty Co. I'. Rlackicrll, 383 S.W.2d 216 (Texas C.
App. 19(i4); Morris v. J. I. Case Credit Corporation, 411
S.\V.'2<1 7s:1 (Texas C. App. 19G7). There is logic behind
tliis approaeh. Tlw doctrine of apparent authority is
j11stifo·d 11pon the ground that it is more equitable to
]Jlaee th<> loss npon tlw party employing the person who
11i:HlP tl1P
than upon an innocent
Ji<UlY i\'ho e<rnld g<'nnirn_.ly believe that the employee did
lin1P t}ip antlwrity to makP the rwrtinent representations.
t]wnr,\'

lt is axiomatic-, however, that in cases of estoppel
tlwre shonlcl lw some changt> of position on the part of
the plaintiff 1d1id1 l<'ads to his damage. To establish

au t-qnitable Pstoppel, the plaintiff must have injuriously
changed his position. This change of position must result
<lin'rtly from the actions of the defendant or the defendant':,.:
Sep cases cited at pp. 43-48, sitpra.
In Rosto11 1.·. 1V,11coff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956),
tliP ddt>1ulant had promisPd to rent certain premises to
the l1lamtiff on the n•presPntation that he owned the
Jll'Pllli:ses. l'lw deft>ndant did not own the premises and
nnahlt> to
thPm. As a result, plaintiff could
wit lllo\ l' in on tlt<· agn·ed dafr. Later, plaintiff was able
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to negotiate another, but far less fayorahlP,
wit!i;
trne owner. Plaintiff sued defendant baSf='d on a tli f'11].
of contract by estoppel. Tlw supreme conrt lwld lli:i
the doctrine of estoppel could not apply. Plaintiff kt"
not spent any money in reliance upon defendant's pronih
to rPnt the premises to him; he had not changPd his 1111 ,i
tion in any way in reliance upon defendant's promi,b
All he had lost was the bargain that he thought he had
made with the defendant. The court held that this wa.'
not enough to justify the application of the e8t011 !J 1,:
doctrine. Another instructive case is Federal Finw 1c,
Co. v. Humiston, 404 P.2d 465 (Wash. 1965). This case
involved an assignee's action on a conditional sales contract. There was a total failure of consideration in ti:.·
execution of the original contract. The court said that
there could be no estoppel against the buyer unless the
assignee could show that the assignor could have or would
have been able to assert a defense against the original
seller. Since the assignee could make no such showing, '
lie could not recover against the buyer even though
the assignor had sold him a worthless conditional salP>
contract. The court quite correctly pointed out that in
this situation there was no way that the assignee's reliance on the actions of the assignor had damaged him,
as he would have been in no different position against the
original seller.
There are virtually an endless number of anthoritiPs ,
for the proposition that the plaintiff, in order to take
advantage of the doctrine of estoppel, must have sonw
detrimental reliance upon the actions of the defendant
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Jl" 1 i11a i·. Ro1111ey, !)-± Ariz. -±0, 381 P.2d 581 (1963)
i l·i· 1•1rn rt q nokd IY i th a ppron1l the following:
In

TlH· e:-;:o:ential
of estoppel are that
plaintiff, "·ith knowledge of the facts, must have
ass<'rted a particular right inconsistent with that
ass<·rkd in thP instant action, to the prejudice of

another icho has relied Hpon this first conduct ....

Jf a.ny of these essential elements are lacking,
tltl're is no estoppel. TVeiner v. Romley, supra, at
;JS3. (Emphasis by the Court.)

Frey, 412 P.2d 159, 162 (N.M. 1968) the
•.'otut said: "Ahst>nt reliance and injury, <'qnitahle estopprl is inapplicable." In Rheem Mmmfacturing Co. v.
C;1ilcd States, 371 P.2d 578, 581 (Cal. 1962) the court
:::tatPd: "1.'hrre can he no estoppel unless the party asst·rting it rPlied to his detriment on the conduct of the
pNson to be estopped."
fn Gnrcio

1.'.

j.pplying these general and valid principles of law
11> tlw present casP, it is clear that the trial court wrongfull: nwa,-.;nn·d the damages of the plaintiffs. To recover
nm1er a theory of apparent authority, plaintiffs would
havP to show estoppel. To prove estoppel they must
pron• that because of the representations of defendants'
vlaintiffa acted to their detriment. The only
detrimental reliance of plaintiffs was that they
.ioinPd the union. In order to recover strike benefits,
tiw plaintiffs would have to show that because of defendants' 1•mployees' representations they went out on strike.
wne damaged by the strike, not by joining the
union. ThPy were called on strike not by the defendants
httt 1ly the International Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers
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Un_1011. (R.
Plaintiffs \\·cmld 11<\YP
:;i
strike 1..•ven if no representation as to strik<' bc·nf.•fi'ts. 1rnrl
been given by defendant:::;. Plaintiffs' argnment tliat lH'
cause of tlw representations made by defendant"' a<· t
they were injured. and as a result of such ini'nn·
s]i l.'
•
• ' OU 11
be• able to recover
benefits cornpletdy fails in bii
and in logic. The most that plaintiffs should lw ahlP lrr
recover are those damages directly attrilmtahlP to tht·ir
reliance upon representations by defendants' ('rnplo;:ei·'·
The record is devoid of any eYidence of darnag'<'s whil'h
are proximately attributable to plaintiffs' n·lianep l1)Jon
the representations of defendants' agents. f-lincP plain.
tiffs were only entitled to recover their reliancr damage,
the judgment of the trial court is grossly excPssiw anrl
must be reversed. The case should be remandPd to alloi1
plaintiffs to prove reliance damage, if they havr any.
•

0

Strong arguments of policy support the above result. As was mentioned earlier, the doctrine of ap1iamt
authority is a means of protecting relying plaintiffs from
injury and loss. The underlying theory is that \\'here
people suffer injury due to their reliance on another's
representations, that loss should fall upon those parties
who made the representations or who were in control
of those making the representations. It must be remembered, however, that the parties being hdd liable are
themselves not especially culpable. The courts use the
doctrine of apparent authority only as a means of spreading losses. In cases where there has been no dcrtimental
reliance, it would be very unfair to bind principals for
the unauthorized representations of their agent. rrhe
only jm;tification for holding the principal liable is tl 11
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damage suffered by plaintiff due to his reliance on what
he believed to be authorized statements of the agent.
Where there is no reliance damage there should be no
recovery unless actual authority can be proved. There
was no proof of actual authority in the instant case. To
lwl<l that plaintiffs should recover strike benefits is to
say that the defendants are bound on a contract of inf:lnrance by the unauthorized actions of their agents and
that such a contract protects plaintiffs forever against
whatever damage they may suffer no matter the source
nf the damage. The statement of plaintiffs' position carrir·s its mvn refutation.
POINT VIII
THE EVENTS UPON WHICH THE COMPLAINT IS
PREDICATED OCCURRED IN THE COURSE OF A
LABOR REPRESENTATION CONTROVERSY THAT
WAS SUBJECT TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, AND THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
THOSE EVENTS MUST BE MEASURED BY THE
FEDERAL ACT AND THE POLICIES THAT UNDERLIE THAT ACT.

The eyents forming the basis for plaintiffs' com-

plaint occUtTPd in the following setting: The defendant Brotherhood is an unincorporated association which
has functioned as a national railway labor organization
for the greater part of a century. In such capacity,
prior to .June :10, 1967, the Brotherhood had been the
e1TtifiPd bargaining representative of persons employed
as locomotive engineers, trainmen and hostlers by Kenneeott
K <'nTIProH is, of course, engaged in a business that
nffeeb intrrstate commerce, and therefore its labor re57

lations are subject to the National Labor H(•luti , . "\ 1·1
of 1935 (29 U.S.C. §141,. l't. seq.) as re-enacted hy the
Labor-:Management Rdahons Act ( Taft-11 arll<·y A('t) 1,r
1947 and as last amended by the Lahor-1\f anag('lllrnt RPporting and Disclosures Act (Landrum-Griffi11 Art) 1,f
1959 (29 u.s.c. §401).
The plaintiffs, and other employees totalling some
900 persons, were included in a collective-hargaini11g- milt
for which the International Union of Mine, Mill and
Smelter Workers had been, since 1943, certified hy the
National Labor Relations Board (herein called NLRB)
as bargaining representative.
In September, 1966, this unit (herein called "truck
haulage unit") included a number of persons who haJ
previously been employed at Kennecott as locomotive
firemen and engineers. Because of dissatisfaction bv
such individuals and others within the truck haulage
unit with the representation provided by l\iine-1\fill, a
campaign was instituted in which the Brotherhood
sought the truck haulage unit bargaining rights.
During this election campaign, one of the field rep·
resentatives of the Brotherhood arrogated to himself
control of the campaign. He then proceeded to instruct
the other representatives that according to his interpretation of Article 10, Section 3 of the Brotlwrhood Constitution, those employees within the truck haulage unit
who joined the Brotherhood would be entitled to recei1e
strike benefits whenever they participated in a strike
against Kennecott. Late in the election campaign, he
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made the
representation that such Brotherhood benefits would he due them regardless of the outeome of the forthroming NLRB election.

NLRB Pleetion was conducted on June 21 and
22, 1967. Out of the 926 employees eligible to vote, 250
·nited in favor of the Brotherhood and 510 voted for the
competing union which consisted of Mine-Mill as merged
with the United Steelworkers of America.
rriie

We respectfully suggest that the lower court should
have declined jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' complaint
beranse the subject matter of the complaint is a phase
of labor relations that has been preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (herein called "NLRA") (29
r.S.C.
et. seq.). To the extent that legal conseque11ccs attach to campaign promises by representatives
of ln·l){)r irnio11s, prrliminary to the holding of representotion elections, coutrol over that subject has bee.n vested
l1y Congrrss in the NLRB with judicial review being
lodged in the United States Coitrt of Appeals and the
Siiprcnu' Court (29 U.S.C.
159 and 160). Clearly, the
activtties upon which the plaintiffs' action rests in this
case occurred in the course of, and were a direct consequence of, campaign tactics in the context of a representation election.
Vi11en Congress resolved in 1935 to establish a system of rules and policies to regulate labor relations
Ldween employers and employees engaged in interstate
conuuercp, the plan of regulation as it emerged in the
form of the NLRA basically divided the field of em-
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ployer-employee relations into the followinrri-. r11·1'rieipal
.
areas: ( 1) The Section 7 rights of emplovees to Lnr· ·
•
" bane
or not to engage in concerted activity and to fret>ly ,;t.
termine their collective-bargaining representatiw ' if'.. Ull\,
(29 U.S.C. §157); (2) Prohibiting ernployen; and
unions from engaging in unfair lahor
a> ]irr'
vided in Setcion 8 of the Act (29 U.S.C. §158: (3) Thr·
enforcement of employer and employee
and dntii".
as established by collective-bargaining
Jllll
suant to Section 301 (29 U.S.C.
).
The results of this statute, beginning with the in.
terpretation by the Supreme Court of the United
in the case of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957) has been the development of a n011
body of Federal substantive law fashioned from the rules
and policies enunciated by the national labor acts.
The justification for developing a new body oi
Federal substantive law governing the enforcement of
collective-bargaining agreements is the tendency of a
system of Federal law to promote uniform rights and
obligations. This need has been declared many time1
by the Supreme Court. We cite as an illustration the
case of Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffers, Wareho11semt1
H elpPrs v. Litcas Flour Co., 3G9 U.S. 95, 102-04 (19621.
In that case, the Supreme Court stated:
1

* * * We hold that in a case such as this, inrom·
patible doctrines of local law must give way fo
principles of federal labor law . . . .
The importance of the area which w?uld lw
affected by separate systems of suhstanhvr la\\
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mahs tli<· n<>ed for a single body of federal law
particularly eo.mp<'_l1ing. The ordering and adjusting of eornp<>tmg mterests through a process of
free and voluntary collective bargaining is the
krvston0 of the f
scheme to promote industri.al pt>aC'P. State law which frustrates the efforts
of Congr(>ss to stimulate the smooth functioning
of that proc<'ss thus strikes at the very core of
frderal labor policy . . . . With due regard to the
many factors which bear upon competing state
arnl fedPral interests in this area, California v.
Zook, 33G U.S. 725, 730-31, 69 S.Ct. 841, 843-44,
9;3 LJ£d. 1005; Rice 1'.
Fe Elevator Corp.,
331
218, 2;30_;31, 67 S.Ct. 11-lG, 1152, 91 L.Ed.
1+-1-7, we eannot but conclude that in enacting
Congn•ss intended doctrines of federal labor
lm'T uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local

The further fruition of the Congressional intention
for a ne1\ body of industrial law to develop and mature
i; illustrated in the case of San Diego Building Tra!des
(01u1cil v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In that case
tlw California Supreme Court had sustained the judgment of tlH' court below which had enjoined the union
from picketing and had awarded resulting damages to
tl1p employer.
r:I'he Supreme Court of the United States granted
CPrtiorari and reversed, holding that the mere fact that
the
had declined to assert jurisdiction over the
(liti]mte (heeanse of insufficient impact on interstate
eo1nrn(·rce) did not leave the state free to regulate activities that had been preempted by Federal law. We quote
a part of thP court's explanation as follows:
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To the National Labor Relations. Hoard and :
must
left those JH'PC'lSP and <·llj,,:
hm1ted demarcations that can be adequatply 1"
ioned only by legislation and administrati<;n.
been
with the 11 ,,1:1
hal conflict of two law-Pnforcrng
,1 .
the disharmonies inherent in two system,'. 1;,
federal the other state, or inconsistent standrn,;.
of substantive law and diff Pring l'('llH·di
schemes. Bitt the 'ltnifying consideration of
decisions has been regard to the fact that (\,
gress has e.ntrusted administra.tion of the Irr!.
policy for the Nation to a centralized ad miJ1islin
tive agency, armed with its own procedures, 11 1,,
equipped with its specialized knowledge and c11 1,.
ulative experience:
11 •

" ... Congress evidently considered that c11
tr.alized administration of specially-desig111
procedures was necessary to obtain unifom
application of its substantive rules and :
avoid these diversities and conflicts likely t
result from a variety of local proced11res 01111
attitu.des towards labor oontroversies. • '·

A multiplicity of tribunals and a diverfiJ·,
of procedures are quite as apt to prod11r
incompatible or conflicting adjudications 1:·
to different rules of substantiv(' lmY. ;: ·
Garner v. Teamsters, etc. Union, 346
490-91, 75 S.Ct. 161, 165, 98 L.Ed. 228.
San Diego B1tilding Trades Cowncil v. GarnuJ'
s1tprn., at 242-43. (Emphasis added.)

Such preemption is further demonstrated in a ca·
in which the Supreme Court held that a dispute must i
considered to be beyond the state's jurisdiction to enk
tain if the conduct involved in the litigation is condut
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"arguably" subject to the jurisdiction of the
\I.RB, Lncul 100 of United Ass'n of Journeymen amd
itilil"i11lices i;. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963). In that de.1,1011 tile Court stated:
l ''
,iiat

rn·ed not and should not now consider

wltdlier the petitioner's activity in this case was

fod('rally protected or prohibited, on any of the
th<·ories suggested above or on some different
basis. It is sufficient for present purposes to
find, as we do, that it is reasonably "arguable"
that thP matter comes within the Board's juris1liction.

*

*

*

Nor do ·we regard it as significant that
Borden's complaint against the union sounded in
contract as vYell as in tort. It is not the label
affixed to the cause of action under state law
that controls the determination of the relationsli ip between state and federal jurisdiction.
Rath<>r, as stated in Garmon, supra, 359 U.S., at
'.2-l-(i, 79 S.Ct. at 780,
"[OJur concern is with delimiting areas of
conduct which must be free from state regulation if national policy is to be left unhampered."

Local 100 of the United Ass'n of Jo11.rneymoo wnd
AzJprcnticcs v. Borden, sitpra, at 696, 698. (Emphasis added.)
\Ve believe the above discussion with reference to
the i.;radual preempetion during the past twenty-five
.1 t·ar..;; is essential to an understanding of the reasons
why, and the methods by which, the Federal government
!in-: assnmed virtually total regulatory control, to the
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exclusion of the state 0trovt>rn1nents,
tween employers and employees.

•"

1a t·ior.s

)J,,

Being realisticallv
aware of such transfoniiet'
•
"11111
on<' can hardly fajl to sense the conflict hPtwePn a' .1a\I'
,'
assuming jurisdiction over an action of the kind in 1111
instant case and the administrative plan }lronrnlg-atr,,1
by Congress in §§9 and 10 of the NLRA.
The authority of the NLRB to ascertain with
finality whether a union ha:s the right to bargain
behalf of a group of employees is spelled out in
of the Act. Such authority is premised upon a filing or
a petition by a group of employees, a union or an em.
ployer. Upon its receipt the Act provides that the 1"LRB
shall "investigate" and make a determination so as tn
assure that the employees have a truly free choice in
selecting what, if any, collective-bargaining representa.
tive they de'sire for an appropriate
unit.
After the NLRB has issued a certification as lo
the results of an election, the opportunity for judicial
review of the organizing tactics used by the unions anil
the certification does arise if the NLRB has occasiun
to subsequently issue an order directing the employer
to meet and bargain with the certified union in accord·
ance with §10( c) of the Act (29 U.S.C.
c) ).
In this judicial review, the whole NLRB recnrJ
developed during the investigation becomes a part ui
the record upon which an order to cease or desist frorn
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--an unfair labor practice is predicated by the NLRB.
Thi;:; is accomplished hy W(d) of the Act (29 U.S.C.
H59(d) ). One(• the Board issues such an unfair labor

practice order, the gate is open for aggrieved parties to
obtain judicial review hy the United States Court of
;\
and a second review by the Supreme Court
pursuant to
f) of the Act (29 U.S.C. §160(f) ).
On the hasis of the authority granted and the procechue pn•scrihed hy
and 10 of the NLRA, it is
c·h·ar that Congress intended there should be a minimum
of gowrm1wntal n·gnlation of the election tactics used
and that such regulation he vested exclusively, in the
fust instam·P, in the NLRB with the limited judicial
hy tltE'. Federal Court of Appeals under §lO(f)
of tlw Ad. This conclusion was affirmed by the SuJireme Conrt in Boin: v. GrcyhoU!Yld Corporation, 376
r .S. ±00 ( 19G-l).
ConnsPl for dt>fendants, in preparing this brief, have
made an exhaustive search of the court decisions in an
t-ffort to find a precedent for the plaintiffs' case. We
have found no surh precedent. If the theory upon which
the plaintiffs ])]"edicate their action is sound, one should
r\i:srover precedents by the score for plaintiffs' action.
'l'lrnt \\'Ould he true simply because it is a fact of com1non know1Nlge in the field of labor relations that great
11mnlH·rs of n·presPntation disputes have been developed during the vears since the enactment of the NLRA
:irnl t11at representatives of the union, whether they are
c·ngngPd in an election contest 1vith an employer or in

65

a competitive effort with another union are not ,.
.
.
· -01wu&
lavish (or loose) m the promises that they make.
The reason for no such precedents is that such Br·
tjon, if proper, would have the effoct of nullifying·
overriding the Congressional intention that the ad.min],,_
trative regulation of such contests shall be preempter!
by the Federal law.
111

If the courts of fifty states were pennitted to en.
tertain suits sounding in contract or in tort, based upon
the promises or activities during election
the inevitable result would be a state of chaos and con.
fusion in the field of labor relations.

In 1966, the Supreme Court of the United State1
decided Linn v. Unite.d Plant Guard Workers, Local 114.
383 U.S. 53 (1966). The principal question therein pre·sented might be thought to paralle] that raised by thP
complaint in the instant case. Careful examination, ho11
ever, shows that such case is no precedent for the reliei
now sought by the plaintiffs. In the Linn case,
were sought in a civil action for libel instituted rwder
state law by an employer subject to the NLRA for
libelous union statements published during a union organization campaign. The complaint was dismissed hy
the United States District Court and such finding was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court
in reversing the Court of Appeals, explained its ach 111
as follows:
In the light of these considerations it
that the exercise of state jurisdiction here wonl
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1
'

lie a
peripheral concern of the Labor
J\I anagement Relations Act," provided it is limiterl to redressing lihel issued with knowledge of
its falsity, or with reckless disregard of whether
it
true of false. Moreover, we believe that
''an overriding state interest" in protecting its
residents from malicious libels should be recognized in these circumstances. This conclusion i.s
buttressed by our holding in United Construction
Workers v. Laburnwn Construction Corp., 347
U.S. 656, 74 8.'Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025 (1954) ....
Linn v. United Plant Gitard Workers, supra, at 61.
'rhe Court, however, after noting the basis for state
court relief,
In order that the recognition of legitimate state
int0rests does not interfere with effective administratjon of national labor policy the possibility
of such consequenees must he minimized. 1{\T e,
ther<-'fore, limit the availability for state remedies
for lilit->1 to those instances in whi0h the complainant can show that the defamatory statements were
!'irculated with malice and caused him damage.
(Emphasis added.) Linn v. United Plant Guard
Workers, supra, at 64-65.
The Court went on to further emphasize these consider:=1tions as stated in Garrison v. Loitisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75:
" LT] lie use of the known lie as a tool is at once

at odds with the premises of democratic
rnent and with the orderlv manner in which economic, social or political change is to be effected."
We believe that under the rules laid down here
it can be appropriately redressed without curtailment of state libel remedies beyond the actual
nePds of national labor policy. However, if exprricncP shows that a greater curtailment, even
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n
011c, slw11ld lie. 111·ccss11nf fl) Jncr,. II ,,
1
J>C1ir111e11 t _of t lmt Ji;! 1ICIJ. t_l11' Court 11"ill /,, 1,.
to . reco1u-udl'r f.oda .Ifs lwld111r1.
lF1· rln1{ li,.
.
( 11' 11r
ll"ifli a co11stit1rtio11al is,,·11e l!llf sol!'/11 will .''
.
.
,
I 1/i
cl eqree to w l11cl1 state re111ed1es li111·1· /Ji'i·i
I /11·
.
.
1·1111Jted lnf the Act. I .. 11111 r. f"11itnl Pl111if G1111 ,
11
TVork1Ts, s111Jrn, at ()/. (Ernpha:si:s a<l<l<·(l.)
1

In Li1111, the court made it elt>ar that it was 11111
intending to open the door for all sort:s of state action.'.
There is nothing in such d<"cision to imply a right (,1
enforce contractual remedies ari :sing out of an allegeil
electionering off l'r hy tlw l'l'l)I'Psentative of a union anil
an alleged ac<'eptance by the employes. If each of t'11
states is to be free to apply its own eontraetual dortri 11 ,.,
to the vital area of union orgtwizational pffort,, tJ1,
rC'sults could he catastrophic .•Just as in the instant case,
any Prroneous, allwit honest, representation by a uniou
organizer could expose the union aml its membersh11·
funds to a statP claim for damages. Every time a labnr
organization successfully gained the n•pn·s1,ntati1111
rights for a bargaining unit of <·mploy<'<'!:'. its
n:·
failure thereaftf'r in achiPving its campaip;n Jll'Pclidt(111,
of employment gains could be subject to a suit for failm1
to perform.
ThPre is little question that had tlw BLF&E been
successful in winning- tlw K<'nnPcott NLRB <>l('dio11, an;
misrPprrsentation of its organii<·rs could haw
in having tlw election set aside. By the NLRB prn('en·
ures tlw BLF&J<J would thus have bern deniPd the
of its election victory hPcanse of suC'h conduct. Tins i·
the type and the
of regulation desigrn'<l arnl llP 1•1nc·,:

G8

;![ntar:--· by CongTPs:-;. Tf t11is type of action relied upon
11 " tlie plaintiffs i:-; sm;tairn,d, then freedom of discus,;011, persuasion and argument during a NLRB repre,,1.11t;1tion dedion as eontPmp]ated by the NLRA would
lw ckstroYed. 'To t<•:-;t :-Jtwh c-onduct by the ordinary concepts of ('Ontrnd ]aw is as much out of step in this
inslane<' as i11 tl1e <·as1· of a s11cee;.;sor corporation's obligatinn to arhitrate. Jnl111 lVilcy d'; Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,
Tili F.S. 5-l-3 ( 10G-l-). In addition to its effect upon
i·ledion cnnduet, it
SPriously impede the union's
;iliilit:-· to lafrr compromise and accommodate its bar!.!ai11i11g· position. Rather than reach a settlement at a
] 1,nl l<'ss than it had earlier envisioned, the union would
li1' compPllPd to resort to strikes.
Tlw aetivitiPs of def t>ndants in the instant case did
rnJt occur in a vacnmn. 'Tlw t>mployees of a major inPntf>1·prise sueh as Kennecott have long been
rn1·u1IJPrc-: nf or associated with labor unions. There are
<1111m1xi11iatel:--· ninetePn stiparate labor organizations or
n•prese11tatives of various units of Kenner1itt cnq1lo.\"l·1•c-:. 1'1w::-:P Pmployees have long been exposed
l" an<l an· familiar witl1 union organizational and reprefunctions. They must be deemed sophisticated
::u11l fnll.v mnuP of tlw nature of electioneering promises
rnarle Jiy unions during a representational campaign. It
is cmnpktely nm·Palistie for them now to attempt to
t<1kr· ont of eontPxt onP particular campaign promise and
tn dP\'at<· it to an enforcoable contractual right.

\rp re::-:11r>etfnlly snhmit that thP plaintiffs' complaint
:;] 1<111 ld not lw PntntainPd by either state or Federal
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courts, because the authority vested in the NLRB Li
and. 10 of the Act dearly indicates that Congre;,
did not mtend that the campaign tactics indulg"d
·
c
in 11·1
unions during organization drives preceding rerire sen.·
tution elections should be "regulated" by the states bi
permitting such tactics to be made the subject of action',
in state courts based upon the common law of
and agency.
POINT IX
THE PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE
A CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED UNDER SECTION 501 OF THE L.M.R.D.A.

The above contention is based principally upon
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dif.
closure Act of 1959 (29 U.S.C. §501).
The plaintiffs are subject to §501 because they come
'vithin the definition of "employee" as set forth in
of the Act (29 U.S.C. §402(f) ). Section 50l(a) read'
as follows:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, anJ
other representatives of a labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation to sue? organ
ization and its members as a group. It 1s, thm
fore, the duty of each snch per;:;on,
int i
account the special problems and
of 1
labor organization, to hold its money a11d_ pr111
1

<

erty solely for the benefit of the orgamznlin!
and its members and to manage, invest, amd er
pend the same in accordance with its constit1d!o
and bylaws and any resolutions of the
11

bodies adopt<:>d thereunder .... (Emphasis added·
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1

The primary evil at which that statute is directed
manifestly the embezzlement and other unlawful use
of lUtion funds by union officials. But the literal lang-uage of the statute forbids union officials from using
or expending union funds in any manner that is "not in
11 ccordancc with its constitution and bylaws."
Thus, Federal law precludes state courts and juries
f rorn compelling union officers to use union funds for
purposes or in any manner that is not consistent with
the union's constitution. This view is supported by obmade hy the United States District Court in
the case of Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers, Loo(J)l
ll!'l 'V. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
r:I'he complaint in the Cohen case sought a prelimiuary injunction to prohibit the officers of Local 107
frnm nsing union funds to defray the legal costs of
d('fending the officers in the criminal and civil actions
hronght against them in the courts of Pennsylvania.
ThP principal question presented was whether the expcnditurp of union funds to pay legal fees to defend the
officers of Local 107 was improper in light of the prohihition s contained in
of the Act, notwithstanding the expenditure was authorized by resolution of
the union mf'mbership passed at a regular union meeting.
The ultimate decision reached was that the expenditure authorized by the resolution was beyond the power
of l iocial 107 to make. Accordingly, the expenditure was
deemPd an improper use of union funds and, hence, was
'4 Yiolation of
(a) of the Act. The district court's
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decision was ::iJfirrned ln'
th<> Court of' .\Jill<"tl
·.
•
( ;..; 1fl]' 1,
Third Circuit (:28-± F.:!d 1
aml tli1•
(' ,
l
111:1
deniPd certiorari (3G5 U.S. 83:3).
Tlw pertinent provisions of the' Brotherhood'·· c·fil
stitution pertaining to strike benefits are contained 1
the paragraphs that comprise Article 10, NPction;},"
the Constitution. Paragraph (a) of Nection 3 is a tor.
trolling provision and reads as follows :
The rate of pay to each memhPr and ni:r:
member engaging in a. legal strikr authoriz/il ;,,
this organiz.ation shall lw three dollars ($3.1n1
per calendar day .... (Emphasis addPd.)
Paragraph ( e) of Articl\' 1O. S<·etion 3, is al:;o a 11 1
provision in the Brotherhood's law. It reads as follow'.
The provisions of this Section conePrning :!·
payment of strikt> benefits are
onlp11,,
shall not be tlw basis of any legal liability on ti,
part of the Brotherhood ....
The Brotherhood's field representative during tl1°
election campaign announced that his interpretation
Article 10, Section 3, would entitle thm;e employees 11it::
in the truck haulagr unit who became memhrrs of t1
Brotherhood during the organization campaign to rPcei1
strike benefits regardless of whether the Brotherhor
lost thr election. That interpretation manifestly mei]
that the Brotherhood would pay strike benefits to !Ii
plaintiffs notwithstanding the Brotherhood did not an
thorize the strike and had no control ovPr it, and re,Q"aril
less of the cause of the strike or the nature of the dispur'
that led to the strike.

1

1

1
'
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Patently, the interpretation placed on Article 10,
Sretion 3i of the Con::>titution by such field representatin: calls for the payment of strike benefits to members
un<ler circumstances not mdhorized by the language of
tlic Constitutron.
rrherdore, if tlw President and the Finance Comrnitter of tlw Brotherhood were to formally authorize
thr payment of ::;trik0 benefits to persons, either members or non-mL'mhers, ,,-ho are engaged in a strike which
the Brotherhood did not call, and over which it has no
control, such US<' of Brotherhood funds, although authorized by the top finaneial officers of the Brotherhood, 1rnuld lie a Yiolation of
(a) of the Reporting
and Disclosure Act, and hence, would be an unlawful
nsr of Brotherhood funds. (Exhibit D-136.)
Defendants do not believe the prohibition m §501
against the use of union funds for a purpose for bidden
h>- Article 10, Section 3, of the Brotherhood's Constit11tion can lw disrqrnnlt>d by any person, or by a Brothnhood officer, nor may it be disregarded by any court
M jury
Thr Federal law in §501(a) must be deemed
c·0ntrolling over all persons and all state authorities.
For that reason. 'In' respectfully submit that the plaintiffs' complnint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
CONCLUSION
rc1w judgment below should be reversed because the
findings of fact upon which that judgment is based are
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1101 snpJH>rt<'<l h>· tltt> <'vid<'lH'<>. Ev(•Jl if th , 1.. .
OSfl tn1\111:
W!'l'<' support<'d h>· the p\·id<'IH'<'• tht> •J.U<l<rment
·]rnu ]', ,
1-1
.
1
l'<'Vl'l's<'d lH'eaus<>, as a rnatt<•r of law, any emitt·"····,.'"
strikP lH'n<'i'its to 1ltl'SP plaintiffs \\"as 11/tru 1 in.:
urnon <·onstitution and <·onld not llf· h·1-:!•<l
.
111 Jon a1·
' .
•

1l!

]'I

ag-Pnry. irnpliPd anthorit>·, apparPnt authority or ra;
fieation tlH'ory, and lweausp th<' eourts should not int.,
pre.t a union constitution where valid provisions for r:
interpn'tation an' provided tlwrPin.
Further, ddt>ndants havP not waived their right,
limit strik<' lwnPfits to thosp months in whieh tlw strilr
<'HrnPd lt>ss than $lf)O.OO from outsidP sourees, nor"
tlH•y Pstopp<'<l from assPrting- tll<' lirnitation. Tlw tr
<'ourt <'JTPcl in failing to so lilllit tht> benefits. fa'.
a:-:smning- that dalllag-<'s WPn' n'em·prahl<· by the pla1:
tiffs. tlw trial court PIT<'d in allowing counsel for plair
tiffs to eircnlariz<' potPntial plaintiffs to join the cla·
and furtht->r Prr<'d in tht> measurP of damages usrrl:
('(1lllputc• tll<' jndgirn•nt.
In a<ldition, tlu• jndg-11wnt lwlow should hr
lH•cans<• tll<' eonrt had no jnrisdirtion over the subjlf·
rnattPr, plaintiffs
fail<·<l to Pxhanst tlwir intr
union r<'lllPdies. 'rh<' trial eourt also lacked jurisdictir1r
ovPr th<' suhjPct matter of this action since the ewn'·
upon which thP suit is based occurred in the context of:
National Labor Relations Board supervised union elf,
tion and the regulation of such union activity is pr'
Pmptt>d by Ft>deral law. Moreover, the expenditure r:
union funds is govt>rrn•d by
of the Labor-ManaL'e

lfrportrnµ; and Disclosure Act which forbids pay1111 nt ril' ,.tnkP lwnPfits contra the constitutional provic;on" d tliP nnion. lnkq)retation of
is a question
1'1Parh p1·(·e111vted hy Federal law and the state court
111 U1out .1urisdiction in the matter.
!iwllt

For tli1, forpgoing reasons, defendants respeotfully

snhrnit that tlw ;judgment entered by the trial court
slwnld la: reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

:MULLINER. PRINCE & MANGUM
ROBERT M. YEATES
Dl•JNIS R.
Attorneys For DefendantsAppellants
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